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Security certificates were designed to act as orders for the immediate detention and 
expedited deportation of persons deemed to be threats to national security. Legislated 
during the Cold War when espionage was a heightened threat, the deployment of 
certificates as a counter-terrorism strategy is complicated by the resistance of persons 
named as threats to national security (“named persons”), legal counsel, and popular 
movements. This has resulted in protracted detention and delayed deportation for named 
persons. The failure of deportation objectives has resulted in a complex governing 
assemblage, one that enfolds procedures and personnel from various registers. Extended 
detainment has led to the borrowing of various technologies from the disciplinary 
apparatus, such as provincial detention centres, federal prisons, and conditional release 
strategies that make use of sureties. Elements of the legal apparatus are also incorporated: 
Special advocates are invented to deal with the issues of secrecy surrounding national 
security process as intelligence is introduced as ‘evidence’ in courts that are tasked with 
the problem of determining the reasonableness of certificates and associated detention. 
This blurring of intelligence and evidence risks the establishment of troubling precedent 
for immigration and criminal proceedings. An examination of the spatial-temporal 
(chronotopic) dimensions of certificate processes reveals how a state of insecurity can 
morph into an improvised assemblage combining security and legality. This examination 
of certificate proceedings provides insight into how non-citizen terrorism threats are 
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This dissertation provides an analysis of various facets of the Canadian Security 
Certificate Initiative (SCI). Created as an administrative immigration process to respond to 
threats such as Soviet espionage, organized crime, and terrorism in 1978, the SCI is 
currently in use to remove non-citizen, terrorist threats from Canada. The initial SCI 
process involved the issuance of the certificate by designated Ministers on the 
recommendation of government agencies regarding the inadmissibility of the individual 
named in the certificate. Certificates were designed to act as expedited deportation orders. 
They have succeeded as such in some cases, but the process has faced more resistance 
from ‘named persons’ and their legal counsel and has become more protracted over time. 
Initially, a Special Advisory Board provided oversight for the SCI, but judges have 
become involved in ‘reasonableness’ hearings, leading to extended detention and 
seemingly more thorough scrutiny of the cases made against named persons, with a 
movement towards protecting the rights of these non-citizens. The introduction of the 
courts and extended detainment have led to the incorporation of criminal tools to manage 
named persons as well as to establish precedent for rulings—though the SCI remains a 
purely administrative assemblage. 
To provide an in-depth analysis of the SCI, the dissertation focuses on five recent 
certificates—those of Messrs. Charkaoui, Almrei, Jaballah, Harkat, and Mahjoub—as 
contextualized within the wider genealogy of the SCI. Each of these named persons had 
certificates issued against them for different reasons at different times, though respondents 
highlighted the temporal correlation with 9/11 and that the men are Muslim. Messrs. 
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Jaballah and Mahjoub had pre-9/11 certificates issued1, while Messrs. Charkaoui, Almrei, 
and Harkat had their ordeals initiated in the months and years that followed. The Reasons 
for Decision in reasonableness determinations, detention reviews, and additional 
judicialized aspects of the cases provide insight into the information on which the cases 
are based and the rationales (legal and otherwise) for decisions, reflecting the progress of 
the legislation and cases overall. A significant body of literature exists on the legal 
intricacies of these cases, but the sociological and socio-legal literature is somewhat 
limited. This dissertation fills in a gap by using sociological theory to examine some 
societal and political corollaries of the SCI as a mechanism of governance. This 
investigation illuminates the powerful administrative processes at work under the SCI and 
the use and contestation of the SCI as a viable socio-legal mechanism for the promotion of 
national security. The evolution of the SCI indicates a post-9/11 political climate that 
prioritizes national security over honouring conventional legal proceedings. 
This dissertation approaches the SCI as a problem of governance and as a problem 
of the ‘scale’ of governance. Focus on the notion of scale allows for conceptualization of 
how the SCI integrates multiple systems of legality from different ‘levels’ of governance. 
In other words, it considers how criminal and immigration components are appropriated, 
distorted, and integrated into national security administrative law and proceedings. The 
question driving this dissertation is: How are non-citizen national security suspects 
managed in Canada? As an assemblage of national security, the SCI appropriates 
technologies from the rule of law abiding criminal justice and immigration systems and 
perverts them by applying them in a way that dishonours rights and justice norms. The 
                                                
1 Mr. Jaballah had a Certificate issued against him in 1999, which was quashed by a judge and followed by 
another Certificate based on “new” information in August 2001. 
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SCI operates under some rules of exceptionality and with questionable (il)legality, as 
reflected in the many arguments in court that range from the conditions of detention and 
release to the constitutionality of the SCI. Rather than develop a theory of scale, the aim is 
to use a scalar analytic to understand how security detention is at work in Canada through 
interviews and document analysis.  
Methodology 
 
To understand the functions of the SCI, interviews were organized through email 
and mail with individuals working with the SCI in varying capacities. The names of 
lawyers and judges involved in the legal proceedings are listed in public documents and 
internet searches provided email addresses for these individuals. Using chain-referral or 
‘snowball’ sampling (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002) I asked interview respondents to 
identify others points of contact and information on SCI processes. This process produced 
additional names and contact information for supporters involved in the popular 
movement to abolish certificates as well as individuals employed by organizations 
advocating for human rights and migrant issues. Inquiries and multiple follow-up emails 
yielded a total of twenty interviews. 
An interview guide was developed and utilized, but questions and the interview 
style were kept open and ‘active’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) to allow respondents to 
speak to relevant issues, such as their professional experience working on the cases or 
within the popular movement to abolish certificates. This approach generated information 
on facets of the SCI that were previously not part of the project and opened fresh areas of 
examination such as the ‘behind-the-scenes’ struggle of special advocates and their 
limited access to intelligence and witnesses. The use of secret evidence complicated the 
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project as there were restrictions on what could be known about the cases. However, 
notably, more individuals who acted as special advocates and have seen the secret 
information were interviewed than counsel who were not constrained on what could be 
communicated. No classified information is used in this project, but insight from 
individuals who have seen the full case files offers a robust understanding of how the SCI 
is managed.  
Interview respondents included: open counsel, special advocates, and legal 
professionals who have acted as both open counsel and special advocates, a member of the 
judiciary involved in SCI proceedings, individuals working in the area of human rights, 
advocacy, or as community activists,2 legal scholars, a journalist who covers national 
security issues, and a representative of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Email 
responses were received from a representative of the Canadian Security and Intelligence 
Service (CSIS). Representatives from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 
(IRCC)3 and Public Safety Canada (PSC) declined interviews because of “ongoing 
litigation.” Correctional Service Canada declined an interview because CBSA was 
deemed the appropriate ‘detaining authority’ at the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre 
(KIHC). No response was received from those acting as Ministers’ counsel in SCI cases or 
from the provincial detention centres involved in SCI detention. Respondents that were 
interviewed indicated that there would be trouble gaining perspective on the government 
side, while one thought that some Ministers’ counsel likely would be willing to be 
interviewed. The ‘Reasons for Decision’ offer valuable insight into the perspective of 
                                                
2 Interview respondents are identified based on their role. Those working within the popular movement to 
abolish certificates are recognized by how they self-identify. 
3 Previously Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 
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judges as two judges declined interview requests stating that “the judgments of the Court 
on these issues speak for themselves” and that “judges are to speak through their reasons.” 
The secrecy surrounding the SCI was both a hindrance to research and a topic of 
exploration.4 While most judges provided two separate Reasons for Decision—one public, 
one classified—some Reasons for Decision were heavily redacted, making it difficult to 
understand the nuances of cases, as shown in the following redacted extract: 
 
Illustration 1: (Mahjoub (Re), 2010 FC 787 (CanLII) p. 73) 
While archival research affords valuable insight into government process, this dissertation 
emphasizes the experiential aspects of navigating the SCI. Document analysis provides 
                                                
4 One respondent was not comfortable being interviewed over the phone or having their interview recorded 
because CSIS has been known to tap phone lines—this discomfort was validated by other lawyers 













important context for interviews, and using publicly available court documents bypassed 
the access challenges of secret and redacted documents. Clément (2015) suggests that 
historical research is hindered by government secrecy. However, Access to 
Information/Freedom of Information (ATI/FOI) requests can provide rich databases for 
research when the nuances of making requests are understood (Walby and Larsen, 2011a, 
2011b). Based on ATI/FOI requests, archival research on the SCI by Larsen and Piché  
(2009) yields important insights into SCI governance mechanisms, with significant 
archival research also having been carried out on the policing and surveillance of activism 
(See Crosby and Monaghan, 2016; Monaghan and Walby, 2012, 2016; Walby and 
Monaghan, 2011). Kealey (1988) suggests that it is safer for CSIS to release the files than 
to get a precedent-setting ruling from the court; however, “The depths of information 
accessed through the [Access to Information Act] can be remarkable, yet researchers 
continue to encounter stonewalling” (Monaghan and Walby, 2012: 138). Carrying out 
interviews provides a non-government viewpoint and avoided the potential downfalls of 
archival research on a government mechanism that relies heavily on secrecy. 
Theoretical Intervention 
 
The main theme of this dissertation is the relationship between legal norms and 
security exceptions as evident in the use of general suspicion leading to deportation and 
banishment (Bigo, 2006). The SCI could be characterized as both a pre-crime measure 
(Zedner, 2007) and ‘counter-law’ (Ericson, 2007a); however, the SCI is more than a pre-
crime undertaking or law that undermines conventional notions of legality. Numerous 
legal challenges have shaped the SCI into an ad hoc assemblage whose legal failings and 
unconstitutional status are the subject of abundant revisions. Despite the ongoing 
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challenges, and being, in part, a relic of the Cold War, the SCI is continually upheld as a 
functional—or, at least functioning—security initiative. 
The idea of counter-law has largely been focused on criminal sanctions and the 
criminalization of what has previously not been accepted as criminal behaviour. There are 
two forms of counter law: “passing laws that negate the traditional principles, standards 
and procedures of criminal law,” and “surveillance infrastructure that facilitate direct 
behavioral control and self-policing without recourse to legal regulation” (Ericson, 2007b: 
3, citing Foucault, 1995 (1977 edition)). Authors writing on counter-law do so mostly in 
reference to criminality (Ericson, 2007c; Lawrence, 2017; Levi, 2009). Using this 
literature as a starting point, Larsen and Piché  (2009: 209) expand upon the criminal 
concept suggesting that “The Canadian security-certificate mechanism is a textbook 
example of counter-law.” By framing the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre within 
Ericson's (2007) theory of counter-law, Larsen and Piché  (2007: 16) show how the SCI 
reflects such neo-liberal risk management strategies despite the process deliberately being 
kept distinct from criminal law. While the SCI meets the characteristics of ‘law against 
law’ and the erosion of traditional legal standards in the face of uncertainty, the lack of 
criminality opens up new avenues for consideration.  
The connection between counter-law and pre-crime traces back to the Vagrancy 
Act of 1824 in the United Kingdom (Lawrence, 2017). Such legislative and enforcement 
practices are also characterized as the difference between the talk of law (law on the 
books) and the walk of law (law in practice) (Calavita, 2010). The suggestion that there is 
a “long history of the power to arrest and convict on suspicion and intent” (Lawrence, 
2017: 526), supports Levi's (2009) analysis of 1992 ‘Gang Congregation Ordinances’ in 
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Chicago, and Ericson's (2007c) assertion that counter-law is not a product of 9/11.5 
Rather, vague legislation and broadly defined police powers and discretion characterized 
(self-) policing and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Ericson, 2007b), as well as stop and 
search abilities as terrorism precaution in London dating back to 1994 (Lennon, 2015).  In 
exemplifying the integration of national security into criminal justice, McCulloch and 
Pickering (2009) suggest that criminalizing preparatory acts for an offence is actually too 
late—national security advances a temporal shift to criminalizing intent and therefore a 
movement towards “pre-pre-”crime. Such a temporal shift appropriately characterizes the 
SCI where intelligence seemingly does not even offer enough proof to mount a legitimate 
pre-crime charge under conventional rules of evidence.  
Counter-law is a pre-crime crime strategy to the extent that it treats “everyone as if 
they were guilty of criminal intent” (Ericson, 2007c: 6). Where security initiatives tend 
toward ‘pre-crime’ (Zedner, 2007) by securitizing intent (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009) 
and acting in advance of an actual offence, conventional criminal justice systems tend to 
be ‘post-crime’ and reactionary to offences already committed. Counter-law as used for 
national security and to manage the risks of terrorism often invokes criminalization 
strategies6 (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009) in addition to war and militarization 
strategies (Welch, 2007).7 Under the SCI, counter-law treats persons named in certificates 
as if they are criminals guilty of intent, but maintains the assemblage under administrative 
law; ideas of pre-crime and counter-law that emphasize policing and criminality are 
                                                
5 Though post-9/11 examples exist in legislation such as the 2001 USA Patriot Act and the Canadian Anti-
Terrorism Act.  
6 Though the “terrorist” label is pre-emptive and political rather than criminal (McCulloch and Pickering, 
2009). 




complicated by the lack of formal reference to criminal justice and emphasis on 
administrative immigration measures. Law may shape the appearance of governing 
powers (sovereignty) (Pavlich, 2013) with the SCI evidencing precluding and hybrid 
governance. The nuances of criminality come out in the treatment (detainment) of 
individuals and some of the proceedings and motions utilized, however there is no 
officially recognized connection between the SCI and the criminal justice system. 
Rather than the discretionary policing of counter-law (Ericson, 2007c), broad 
judicial powers enable judges under the SCI to transgress the high standards of evidence 
and procedure associated with criminal justice, with vague standards (not) defined by 
legislation leading to fewer rules to constrain CBSA enforcement agents. Both Lennon 
(2015) and Welch (2007) write of counter-law initiatives that have not passed judicial 
scrutiny. The SCI differs in that it was ruled unconstitutional in a 2007 Supreme Court of 
Canada ruling (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 
2007 SCC9), but was left in place and the government was allowed one year’s time to 
make it constitutional.8 Despite acknowledging the ‘law against law’ features of the SCI, 
it was allowed to continue under the auspices of national security. 
The premise of counter-law under the SCI and national security, is addressed by 
McCulloch and Pickering (2009: 634) who suggest that a “legal framework that tries to 
see into the future inevitably blurs the line between evidence and intelligence.” Under the 
SCI, intelligence is used in the place of evidence to support detention and, ultimately, the 
banishment of terror suspects. Such undertakings, founded on the need to protect state 
secrecy, push the SCI beyond the limits of conventional legality into a space of exception. 
                                                
8 This was done through the creation of the Special Advocate Program and upheld as constitutional in 2008 
(Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 2 SCR 326, 2008 SCC 38 (CanLII)). 
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Actions in this space are carried out in an ad hoc manner. The temporal premise attempts 
to designate an act as “pre-pre- crime,” however, both the legislative premises and the 
detention practices that they enable are subject to continual revision and prolonged legal 
battles. Much of the literature on Ericson's (2007a) counter-law connects with Agamben's 
(2005) state of exception, as a provisional governing strategy. Both focus on the 
suspension of the (legal) norm and the exception becoming the norm. In this instance, the 
SCI is best characterized by the twin processes of the securitization of legality and the 
legalization of security forming a hybrid national security assemblage. In other words, 
under the SCI, the urgency of securing led to compromises in rights standards typically 
honoured by the law, while at the same time security practices by intelligence agencies are 
subject to more legal rigour as CSIS agents find themselves in court. The ongoing 
contestation reflects the struggle between rights and security being far from zero-sum, but 
a complicated assemblage that incorporates many compromises that satisfy few actors. 
Here, the research contribution elucidates some of the inner working and 
assumptions of the SCI as a legal assemblage that indicates the ongoing shift of 
governance. Detention, court practices, and SCI spacetimes make up parts of a governance 
network. This dissertation shows the progression of how actors operating within ‘nodes of 
governance’ (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing, 2005) adapt to the complexity of national 
security and manage problems that arise. The contestation within these more recent SCI 
cases exposes the lapse of broad legal principles within democratic society—a core 
consideration of Critical Legal Studies (Calavita, 2010); both undefined detention and the 
use of intelligence in the courts lack clear legislative precedent, while the SCI spacetimes 
demonstrates the problem of unworkable conditions and knowledge deficits for actors. 
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The governance processes that have developed within these nodes reflect a hybrid use of 
legal and (il)legal/exceptional measures within the SCI.9 This project offers a careful 
investigation of how practices of governance have transformed with regards to suspected 
national security offenders.  
Chapter Outline 
 
This dissertation carries out a genealogy of security detention in Canada—security 
detention is understood as the detainment of non-citizens on the grounds of national 
security concerns. Certificates are a problem of government as evidenced by the 
maneuvering involved in their perpetuation.10 The constant re-working of the SCI reflects 
the governmentality conception of government as a “congenitally failing operation” 
(Miller and Rose, 2008: 17) and shows the ongoing debate of the relationship between 
security and liberty (Dean, 2010: 138) as shaping an ‘art of government’ that emphasizes 
national security in order to shape conduct (Walters, 2012) of citizens and non-citizens 
alike.  The ad hoc nature of the proceedings and ‘make-it-up-as-you-go’ approach results 
in a protracted process that was initially devised to expedite deportation. Evident in 
interviews and court documents is an ongoing tension between security and justice 
complicated by being administrative (immigration) proceedings with seeming criminal 
consequences. The chapters provide insight into different aspects of the SCI as a 
governance assemblage. Each uses different framing, but all are indicative of a 
                                                
9 Trubek and Trubek (2005) tout the benefits of hybridity in law using the example of combining ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ law. The incorporation of otherwise unacceptable legal practices into the SCI has created both 
‘problems’ and ‘goods’ for the SCI as a governance network (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing, 2005). 
10 Recognizing Latour's (2010) Actor Network Theory, this dissertation exhibits ‘following the file,’ 




governance tool that faces obstacles in attempts to translate or transpose ideas, 
information, and practices between criminal and security environments. 
The first chapter offers an analysis of the detainment and conditional release of 
named persons and offers an analysis of the SCI as a hybrid security assemblage. 
Acknowledging risk management literature, this chapter suggests that measures previously 
reserved for low-level criminal offenders are being utilized to neutralize national security 
threats. Through a combination of sureties and CBSA monitoring, named persons became 
subject to community-based surveillance following prolonged detention. The 
‘crimmigration’ literature suggests that the SCI operates discretely from common, 
criminal, and immigration law, but incorporates characteristics of each under the guise of 
‘speculative risk.’ Use of preventative, rather than punitive, measures such as common 
law peace bonds justify release and associated conditions. However, the seriousness of 
allegations and harshness of restrictions is suggestive of punishment that uses emotionally 
and financially invested loved ones as jailers. 
The second chapter probes the use of intelligence in the place of evidence within 
courtrooms. As an example of Baudrillardian simulation, grounding cases in ‘secret 
evidence’ constitutes a political structure (homo sacer) of ‘simulated justice’ that creates a 
zone of indistinction at the threshold between potentiality and reality and the norm and the 
exception, acting upon the figure of ‘bare life.’ Court documents and interview excerpts 
highlight the problem of using duplicated, translated, and transposed intelligence in place 
of evidence. Under the SCI the ‘proof’ threshold is significantly lower than that of 
criminal law and, even with the introduction of special advocates, the possibility of 
rigorously testing the information is limited. By elucidating the (unclear) path of summary 
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information, the ‘inequality of arms’ in court, and the overclaiming of national security 
privilege by Ministers, reliance on intelligence obscures reality and presents problems for 
governance. 
The third chapter uses a genealogical approach to explore the spatial and temporal 
aspects of the SCI. The scalar dimensions of SCI involve ideas of affect, time, space, and 
jurisdiction to constitute a form of legal chronotope that explains some of the more 
obscured components of the SCI as a governance process. Mood pervades the SCI in its 
entirety and acts as context for the examination of the spatial and temporal confines of 
characters working on the court cases. Approaching the SCI as a spatiotemporal event 
reveals that the SCI works as an ad hoc assemblage. This impromptu quality is reflected in 
the series of legal challenges that work to defuse terrorist threats via spatial and temporal 
manoeuvring. The necessity of spatial and temporal manipulation, as well as the affect of 
unease, is a consequence of efforts to manage secrecy. 
Summary  
 
Providing national security for Canada is the intent of the SCI. Understood as for 
the common good in a democratic state, security enterprises are often left unquestioned by 
citizens. Fueled by anti-immigrant, racist, and terrorist threat rhetoric11, there exists a 
powerful opinion that ‘they must have done something’12 to initiate the removal process. 
However, the SCI, applicable to only non-citizens, has acquired a popular movement of 
                                                
11 (Anderson, 2013; Bell, 2011b; Benhabib, 2004; Buck-Morss, 2003; Goldberg, 1993, 2009; Mamdani, 
2004; Mills, 1997; Mountz, 2010; Pratt, 2005; Razack, 2002, 2008; Said, 1979, 1997; Stasiulis and Bakan, 
2005; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007) 
12 One respondent noted that “sometimes, yes, there can be smoke without fire” when it comes to security 
accusations (Interview with Community Organizer, Ottawa, July 2015). 
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citizens campaigning against it.13  Concerns with security measures are largely due to the 
countering of security with freedom, rights, and justice. Opposition to the SCI is rooted in 
the violation of rights of named persons and secrecy surrounding the proceedings.14 
Suspicion centred on secret knowledge, the introduction of intelligence in the place of 
evidence, and the goals of deportation and banishment complicate the SCI process for 
which inventive solutions are posed. While named persons languish under improvised 
detention release conditions, the legal process continues within liminal spaces with special 
advocates serving as intermediaries of security and justice.   
As a collection, these three chapters address diverse but connected aspects of the 
legal-exceptional nature of the SCI. This dissertation presents a sociological and socio-
legal analysis by offering insight into two main institutional spaces in which the SCI is 
implemented—those of confinement (exceptional detention in institutions and the 
community) as addressed in the first chapter and those of decision-making (the courts) as 
addressed through a consideration of intelligence as evidence in the second chapter. The 
in-depth consideration in the third chapter provides a spatial-temporal context (the 
bunkers) for the distinctive judicial and advocate roles. Together, these chapters show how 
the governing of non-citizen suspects involves the interaction and interplay of judicial 
norms and security exceptions through consideration of conditional release, courtroom, 
and legal spatial-temporal practices. The precariousness of non-citizen governing in 
pursuit of national security in Canada requires reconsideration to ensure a cohesive and 
                                                
13 Some organizations that have taken a public stance against the SCI include: Amnesty International, 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Council for Refugees, Homes Not Bombs, and International 
Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. 
14 Palmer (2012: 524) suggests that opposition to illiberal practices by criminologists and ‘academic elite’ 
come from the privileged position of not being “held accountable should a bomb explode killing and 
maiming innocent civilians.” 
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Chapter I: Speculative Risk: Legal hybridity and the management of terror suspects 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the risk assessment and release of migrants detained under 
the Canadian Security Certificate Initiative (SCI) for suspicion of involvement in terrorist 
activities. As an administrative assemblage designed to manage terror threats, the SCI 
incorporates some, but not all, of the logics and legal practices used to manage risk in 
criminal cases. Assemblage refers to a collection of techniques used to govern populations 
(Foucault, 2007a).15 16 In this case, risk assessments are carried out by members of the 
judiciary who render decisions about the release and release conditions of suspected 
security threats. Release decisions are based largely on the trust accorded to community 
and familial sureties, rather than suspects, and bonded community functionaries are 
enlisted to act on behalf of the state in managing terror threats. These functionaries are 
tasked with providing ‘soft’ surveillance of suspects with the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA) providing additional ‘hard’ oversight of suspects and their bonded 
sureties.17 This strategy for managing terror threats involves ‘speculative risk,’ a hybrid 
risk regime utilizing selective and rescaled common, criminal, and immigration law 
conventions to enact a form of community-based surveillance. 
                                                
15 Following Rabinow, Walters (2012: 77) suggests that apparatuses are “stable and enduring”, while 
assemblages are “highly experimental, fluid and possibly ephemeral”; “Assemblages either crystallize into 
apparatuses, or they fragment and disappear.” The Charkaoui II decision and the creation of the Special 
Advocate Program has entrenched the SCI, however subsequent decisions have made significant changes to 
the SCI and its future utility has not yet been realized. 
16 Legg (2011: 131) suggests that “apparatuses be considered a type of assemblage” and that they exist in a 
dialectical relationship both as concepts and things. Following Deleuze, assemblages are useful for 
conceptualizing opposing forces and re-/de-territorialisation that exist in continual resistance and can lead to 
order or disorder, though without resolving the opposing forces (Legg, 2011: 129). 
17 The terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ denote different kinds of surveillance, rather than differences in the degrees of 
surveillance. That is, soft surveillance is not easier than hard surveillance; it is different in intensity. Hard 




Through inadmissibility determinations, the SCI attempts to manage the future and 
to prevent potential security offences from occurring. The decision that someone is a 
potential security threat is supposed to result in their speedy deportation and banishment 
from Canada. While such preventative threat management strategies typically contrast 
with conventional criminal justice logics and procedures, they nevertheless enfold some 
key aspects of criminal justice risk management. The remedial management of security 
threats suggest a ‘scaling-up’ of legal and administrative logics and practices and their 
incorporation in a national security assemblage of the SCI. Such scaling operations are 
reflective of what some scholars call ‘crimmigration,’ the blurring of the differences 
between criminal and immigration law and proceedings.  Notwithstanding the position of 
the SCI within the rubric of immigration law, a technical immigration infraction does not 
have to occur for a certificate to be issued.18 The combinatory nature of these legal 
practices indicates legal hybridity which does not require the government to choose a 
single approach (Trubek and Trubek, 2005). The perspective of this chapter is that the SCI 
is a distinct and transforming national security assemblage that operates separately from 
common, criminal, and immigration law while appropriating aspects of each. As a 
problematical intersection of security and legality, the SCI assemblage is subject to 
ongoing revision (see Walters (2017) on the instability of governmental assemblages). 
Due to the undefined nature and indefiniteness of SCI detention, varying 
technologies are incorporated to manage the risk believed to be posed by named persons, 
which is neither immigration or criminally based. The unique circumstances of the SCI 
have resulted in a form of speculative risk management that occurs alongside other 
                                                
18 The Global Detention Project (2012: 6) states, “Because this ground for detention is not related to 




calculative forms of risk management such as ‘fluid’ and ‘categorical’ risk (see Brown, 
2000), and to which it bears a kind of family resemblance. This form of risk management 
seems unique to crimmigration and the national security context. With preventative, rather 
than punitive, aims and grounded in suspicion rather than immigration or criminal 
offences, the release of non-criminal, non-citizens from national security/immigration 
detention combines hard and soft surveillance by state and community agents to manage 
national security threats.19   
This chapter looks at the use of administrative detention in cases of national 
security that utilizes elements of both immigration and criminal law for its implementation 
and rationalization. The increasing use of detention as a technology of citizenship for 
governing associates immigration with criminality, regardless of the basis for detention 
(Rygiel, 2012). The framework of ‘crimmigration’ is used to understand how legal 
hybridity created by the marrying of these governance nodes is conceptualized, and then 
the chapter builds upon that to demonstrate the SCI as a unique hybrid legal assemblage. 
A consideration of the historical use of peace bonds in civil and criminal proceedings 
suggests that the conditional release of national security offenders is an extension of this 
already existent method of pre-emptive social control. The way in which risk assessment 
strategies are implemented (and perhaps fail) in these cases are examined, and indicate 
that while the dynamics of circumstances are acknowledged, the subjectivity of the 
                                                
19 The conditional release of suspects detained under the Security Certificate Initiative include:   
• Mr. Charkaoui (released in 2004 following his fourth application);  
• Mr. Harkat (released in 2006 following his second application and after the government’s appeal of 
the release decision was dismissed);  
• Mr. Mahjoub (released in 2007 on his third application. He was subsequently returned to detention 
and released again in 2009);  
• Mr. Jaballah (released in 2007 after his third application); and  




suspects endures as a static risk. The difficult position that judges are placed in when 
making decisions based on an amalgamation of laws is noted, and aids in demonstrating a 




This chapter is part of a project that investigated the SCI through interviews and 
court records. Twenty interviews were carried out with individuals working in varying 
capacities within the SCI. Interview respondents included: open counsel, special 
advocates, and legal professionals who have acted as both open counsel and special 
advocates, a member of the judiciary involved in SCI proceedings, individuals working in 
the area of human rights, advocacy, or as community activists, legal scholars, a journalist 
who covers national security issues, and a representative of CBSA. Email responses were 
received from a representative of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). 
Representatives from Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)20 and Public 
Safety Canada (PSC) declined interviews because of “ongoing litigation.” Correctional 
Service Canada declined to interview because CBSA was deemed the appropriate 
‘detaining authority’ at the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre (KIHC). No response 
was received from those acting as Ministers’ counsel in SCI cases or from the provincial 
detention centres initially involved in SCI detention.  
Interviews for this project were open in structure with the respondents being asked 
to speak to what they believed to be important, but followed an ‘active’ interview guide 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). The questions posed to respondents varied somewhat 
                                                
20 Previously Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 
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based on their work with regards to the SCI. Each interview opened with questions about 
how the respondent is involved with the SCI and what their experience has been. The 
questions that followed asked about: the respondent’s experience within Canadian (or 
International) legal systems and how the SCI is similar or dissimilar; what the respondent 
believes is, and is not, working under the SCI; and what changes could be made and what 
should remain in place under the SCI. Questions were also posed about policies, 
regulations, and legislation that may apply to the respondent’s work, as well as what their 
experience and interactions have been with regards to following such government 
guidelines. Further, questions were posed about characterizing the individuals who have 
been detained under the SCI. Finally, respondents were given the opportunity to add 
anything that they felt was not covered by the interview questions. The duration of the 
interviews ranged from twenty minutes to two hours, with most lasting approximately one 
hour. With permission, all interviews except one were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
for purposes of analysis. 
Open and axial coding yielded key themes from the interviews, which were: 
concerns over the blurring of distinctions between intelligence and evidence; the impact of 
preventative detention on rights; and the ‘slippage’ between immigration and criminal 
justice both in terminology and process. This chapter is also based on court records 
concerning applications for release from immigration detention in five recent certificate 
cases. Federal Court Justices were tasked to determine whether deportation was imminent, 
the risk to public safety posed by suspects, and whether and how this risk could be 
managed if the suspect were to be released from immigration detention.  
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Taken together, the datum show a governing assemblage about which there is a 
significant amount of disagreement and ongoing alterations. Most respondents expressed 
unease over the secrecy of the SCI proceedings, indicating this as a foundation for how the 
SCI has transformed. Some respondents were staunchly opposed to the system, while 
another believed that with the introduction of special advocates the SCI can be useful if 
properly managed, despite having self-proclaimed “bitchiness” towards the system 
(Interview with lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). Similarly, Craig Forcese finds that 
following the latest Harkat ruling21  “it’s quite a good system” 22 (Interview, Ottawa, 
October 2014). Another respondent believes that the process has been refined and the 
Special Advocate Program (SAP) is “now well established and it works smoothly” 
(Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). A prominent perspective among the 
legal professionals interviewed was that they are doing their best to work within an 
imperfect system (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, October 2014). One respondent noted 
that there are many legal tools available for dealing with security and immigration, but the 
SCI is akin to using a sledgehammer to hang a picture (Interview with lawyer, Ottawa, 
April 2015).  
Additionally, the datum reflect diverse perspectives; there is no consensus on the 
‘correctness’ of judicial processes or decisions—even the members of the judiciary 
express trepidation about the one-sidedness of the cases they are presented with within 
their Reasons for Decision. The chapter also includes excerpts from Reasons for Decisions 
in SCI reasonableness hearings interspersed with the views of respondents on SCI legal 
assemblage in general, legal procedures, and specific comments on national security 
                                                
21 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII).  
22 This assertion is made in comparison to ‘regular’ immigration proceedings that involve fewer rights 
protections being used for security matters. 
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detention. Before explaining those analytic findings, the chapter considers what 
certificates are, the practices they entail, and their stated aims. 
Security Certificates: National security, immigration, and criminality 
 
Issued and managed by the CBSA and co-signed by the Minister of Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 
certificates are immigration mechanisms used to designate non-citizens inadmissible to 
Canada on grounds of national security. Those subject to certificates are detained in an 
immigration or criminal facility pending their deportation. The legislation was initially 
developed under the Immigration Act of 1976 and currently exists under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2001. Certificates are not post-9/11 creations to 
respond to those acts of terrorism,23 nor have they been used extensively.24 The first 
certificate was issued in 1991 and only twenty-seven have been issued to date (Public 
Safety Canada, 2015). Immigration law is an important antiterrorism tool as it offers 
broader liability rules, lowers the burden of proof, increases periods of investigative 
detention, and enables fewer rights and protection safeguards than criminal law (such as 
the 2001 Anti-Terrorism and the 2012 Combating Terrorism Acts (See Roach, 2011: 41, 
2012)).  
According to PSC, certificates are a purely administrative immigration proceeding 
with the objective of removing non-Canadians who pose a serious security threat to 
Canada and Canadians (Public Safety Canada, 2015). Under IRPA, the specific concern is 
with security, the violations of human or international rights, serious criminality or 
                                                
23 Whitaker (2002: 30) argues that refugee policy in Canada was framed as a national security issue prior to 
September 11, 2001, suggesting that “September 11 simply accelerated a process already well in place but 
not fully up to speed.” 
24 Six new persons have been named in Certificates since the events of 9/11—two of which are accused of 
acts other than terrorism. 
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organized criminality (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001: Division 9, 77(1)). 
These claims allow for the SCI procedures to be carried out through purely administrative 
channels that reduce the onerousness on the government to show cause for inadmissibility 
determinations. Pursuing security threats and serious criminality under immigration law 
creates exceptionality vis-à-vis criminal procedure and legal protections. Under this 
exceptionality, selected logics and technologies are ‘scaled-up’ from the conventional 
criminal justice and immigration systems. The decisions and conditions involved in the 
release of SCI detainees from immigration custody brings to the fore the complex 
relationship of common, criminal, and immigration law and policy. Despite the 
government stance that SCI proceedings are purely administrative and immigration based, 
this chapter suggests that the SCI yields a more complicated, hybrid assemblage of 
security governance. Specifically, gaps in written law (Calavita, 2010) are filled by laws 
playing different, but mutually reinforcing roles (Trubek and Trubek, 2005). Rather than 
selecting immigration or criminal law to govern security, techniques from both may be 
used through legislative amendments and discretion. 
Through various articulations, crimmigration (Stumpf 2006) has become a 
common frame for understanding the nexus of criminal law, immigration policy, and 
security regimes to deal with contemporary migration concerns (Aas, 2011, 2014; Beckett 
and Evans, 2015; Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011; Eagly, 2010; van der Woude, van der 
Leun, and Nijland, 2014: 562). The convergence of crime and immigrations controls is 
also characterized as “ad hoc instrumentalism,” where, in the face of particular problems, 
“officials are encouraged to use whichever tools are most effective” (Sklansky 2012: 161). 
Using immigration law for criminal circumstances is a way for states to 
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“launder…criminal sanctions/punishments through a civil law narrative” because 
deporting someone is easier than pursuing criminal justice sanctions (Koulish 2012: 91).25 
While immigration law absorbs some of “the theories, methods, perceptions, and 
priorities” of criminal enforcement, it also explicitly rejects the procedure of criminal 
adjudication (Legomsky (2007: 469). Crimmigration is seen to result from the 
“criminalization of immigration,” (Stumpf, 2006; Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011) as much 
as it is the result of the “immigrationization of criminal law” (Legomsky, 2007; van der 
Woude et al., 2014). Others argue that the blurred boundary of the criminal law and 
immigration enforcement nexus is a reflection of an “escalating cultural obsession with 
crime and security” Sklansky (2012: 195). This may explain why crimmigration, as an 
approach, did not develop prior to the twentieth century (Cuauhtémoc and Hernández, 
2013).  
In general, the literature suggests that criminal and immigration processes have 
converged around the problem of non-citizen transgressions or potential transgressions, 
and that this convergence is largely driven by securitization processes. While much of the 
crimmigration literature focuses on the criminalization of non-citizens, the SCI is 
concerned with the detention/deportation and subsequent conditional release of suspects 
who are considered security threats but not criminals. As a consequence, the SCI provides 
a unique vantage point from which to examine the nexus of contemporary crimmigration 
and securitization processes.  
Assessing the Threat: How the SCI constructs dangerousness 
 
                                                
25 President Donald Trump’s 2017 “Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement” (VOICE) reinforces the 
problematic ideas behind such approaches (Nixon and Robbins, 2017). 
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Ideas of ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ are prominent in discussions of national security. It is 
thus important to understand how these terms are operationalized and made technical and 
practical by Canadian security officials. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police asserts that 
risk assessment “is a method by which the probability of generally violent behavior is 
estimated for an individual based upon his membership in a particular at-risk group” 
(Meloy et al., 2011: np). Conversely, threat assessment “is concerned almost wholly with 
the risk of targeted violence by a subject of concern, and has a behavioral and 
observational policing focus” (Meloy et al., 2011: np). The type of violence (estimated or 
purposive) may distinguish risk and threat assessments, but both assessment protocols 
share a primary concern of managing the future so as to prevent events from occurring. It 
is noted that securitization routinely employs a ‘family’ of security strategies (see 
O’Connor, Boyle, Ilcan, and Oliver, 2017) for managing the future. In sum, both risk and 
threat are suggestive of an anticipatory and pre-emptive approach to managing violent acts 
as is the purpose of the SCI. 
Threat assessment under SCI incorporates aspects of the risk assessment strategies 
as outlined by Bonta and Andrews (2007). Risk assessment strategies appear at key 
custodial decision points, in pretrial detention, sentencing, and custodial release 
determinations. Early or ‘first generation’ risk strategies involve the subjective 
assessments of criminal justice practitioners and experts who, drawing insights from 
witnesses, records of past offences, and interactions with offenders, assess, on a case-by-
case basis, the character and culpability of offenders. Expressive qualities such as 
‘remorse’ serve as a means of insight into an offender’s character and as an index of their 
risk (Duguid, 2000). Conversely, ‘Second generation’ risk assessments involve statistical 
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estimations of the probability of offending or reoffending based on membership in an at-
risk group while moderating practitioner judgments (Bullock, 2011). Such evidence-based 
models of reoffending are said to be better at predicting criminal behaviour than first-
generation assessments on character (Miller and Morris, 1988). ‘Third-generation,’ or 
dynamic risk, assessments incorporate criminogenic needs into static risk predictive 
models. Systematic monitoring and interventions aimed at assessing and reducing 
criminogenic needs also serve to reduce the risks of reoffending, thus enabling both the 
attenuation of risks and levels of supervision over time (Hannah-Moffat, 2005). 
Conventional custodial and community-based supervision mechanisms, like probation and 
parole, have been augmented by risk strategies to form a carceral continuum where 
variations of risk are met with variable levels of supervision. However, under the SCI the 
information required to carry out assessments such as past records, reliable statistics, and 
trustworthy witnesses are largely absent making it complex to determine the level of 
intervention required in these cases. 
The generational progression of assessments is presented as a refinement and 
improvement of each generation upon the last, however, this ‘progress’ misrepresents the 
multifaceted nature of risk assessment and omits the fact of the deployment of often 
contradictory and conflicting risk rationalities, conceptions, and responses within the 
justice system26 (Bonta, 1996; Brown, 2000; Valverde, Levi, and Moore, 2005). Brown 
(2000) proposes two models of risk in relation to dangerous offenders, putting forward the 
ideas of ‘fluid’ and ‘categorical’ risk as ideas about risk itself.27 Categorical risk 
                                                
26 Valverde (2010) makes a similar argument with regards to security projects generally. 
27 Brown (2000: 96) notes that this model describes risk itself whereas discussions in the literature on risk 




assessments are generated by associating behaviour with “established categories of human 
virtue and character,” resulting in binary classifications system, while fluid risk is 
considered as “something that exists independently of the assessment system” and is 
assessed on a continuum (Brown, 2000: 96-97). Attempts at applying such tidy ideas of 
assessment to the complexity of the SCI results in haphazard decision making, as 
discussed below. 
While criminal justice custodial/release decisions take place under the rubric of 
one or more risk management strategies, the release of suspected national security threats 
from custody generally reflects the “ad hoc instrumentalism” characteristic of 
crimmigration (Sklansky 2012). Evidence-based risk tools developed and deployed to 
estimate and manage risk within criminal justice are notably absent in SCI cases. The 
difficulty in applying such risk tools is establishing a known risk group or category in 
which to enrol the suspect. The application of risk metrics relies on calculations of known 
risks based on aggregated offence patterns of similar known offenders to estimate the 
probability of future offences (and the corresponding level of supervision required) 
(Miller and Morris 1988: 266). When employing professional judgement of risk, 
practitioners/experts often use the nature of the offence (as an index of the offender’s 
character) to support determinations of risk. Each of the five SCI cases involves 
allegations that the suspect is or was a member of a terrorist organization. Substantiation 
of such allegations is largely drawn from repositories of secret information that is 
restricted from public/procedural scrutiny in the interests of national security. Detention 
and deportation are based on suspicion of involvement in terror activities instead of an 
offence having been committed, making it difficult to initialize conventional forms of risk 
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assessment, and making the transposition of risk assessments from criminal to the 
immigration/national security scale problematic. Without a clear offence to enrol the 
suspect into an existing statistical or categorical risk category, judges are forced to 
translate (scale-up) conventional risk management tools to atypical cases.  
The suspects considered in this chapter applied for release from national security 
detention and were eventually released under supervision with their conditions of release 
modified over time.28 As a consequence, these SCI release decisions can be seen as 
managing dynamic risks. Dynamic risk assessments typically include needs, or areas in 
the offender’s life/lifestyle, which, if changed, reduced the risk of re-offending (Hannah-
Moffat 2005: 35). In certificate cases, judges considered changes in ‘preventative means’ 
as criminogenic modulations. For example, Mr. Mahjoub was released from security 
detention once he was able to satisfy conditions that that he would have an appropriate 
surety in place, that is, once his step-son was old enough to serve in that role (Mahjoub v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 171 (CanLII), para. 149). Mr. Mahjoub’s 
case suggests a shift in risk/needs assessment to the social scale, rather than changes to the 
risk subject; while the risk posed by named persons is dynamic based on their 
circumstances, as a risk subject they are considered static.29  
Conducting risk assessments on uninformed individuals while relying on secret 
information puts judges in a precarious position, regardless of their decisions being 
                                                
28 Many post-release hearings took place to change the conditions of release for suspects. In changing the 
conditions of release, judges acknowledged shifting circumstances.  
29 Within literature on risk and criminal penality there are two ‘scales’ to which risk is often applied: the 
‘risk subject’ (Hannah-Moffat, 2005) and ‘risk society’ (Shearing and Johnston, 2005). Risk is multiform 
and amenable to various forms of governance (O’Malley, 2004). 
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equated to national security measures.30 One lawyer noted that “when the Service [CSIS] 
gets up and says, ‘this is insecure,’ the judges are scared” (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, 
April 2015). Much of the information used in judicial determinations would not count as 
evidence in criminal court. The limited ability to cross-examine the information 
supporting the detention of suspects in certificate cases challenges notions of justice 
observed in the criminal system and undermines liberal notions of risk as it does not 
provide the opportunity for informed choice or advised response (see O’Malley, 2009). 
Presented only with intelligence summaries, suspects and their open counsel are not privy 
to classified intelligence information and are less able to refute the suspicion levied 
against them. This same, unknown and non-vetted information is used to measure the risks 
they pose to public safety. 31 And, it is on this information that judges base their decision 
of whether to release and, if so, what release conditions to impose to manage that risk. The 
standard for assessing ‘release risk’ is whether it is reasonable to believe that there is a 
danger or serious threat, whether direct or indirect, to national security or the safety of any 
person, similar to the civil and criminal law ‘balance of probabilities’ standard for pre-trial 
release (Criminal Code, 1985b). However, the overall SCI case standard of ‘reason to 
believe’ is in stark contrast with the civil standard of ‘balance of probabilities’ and the 
criminal standard of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 
With less than thirty certificates having been issued to cover various 
circumstances, SCI proceedings do not present information about risk in a manner 
amenable to actuarial judgment. The lack of statistical data means that risk assessments 
                                                
30 Multiple respondents noted that judges in Certificate cases work under difficult circumstances (Interview 
with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015; Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014; Interview with 
Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). 




are not based on past behaviours and known correlations of the causes of actions (Feeley 
and Simon, 1992, 1994). Judges must use their expertise as practitioners while relying on 
threat assessments provided by CSIS. Respondents characterized CSIS assessments as 
troublesome: “it’s sort of layers upon layers of problem because we have leaps that are 
being made by CSIS in terms of coming to conclusions and in a sense working backwards 
[by seeing their mandate as building a case against Mr. Mahjoub…] And we know that 
they disregard information” (Interview with Yavar Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015; supported 
by Interview with lawyer, Canada, August 2015). This was in addition to one respondent 
who noted with regards to neglected disclosure and retention obligations that CSIS “ought 
to have known or it ought to have guessed that this was a profound failure of imagination” 
for CSIS to be in a position to conduct itself in a way that proceedings would be 
meaningful (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). Practices such as working 
backwards and the destruction of information provided open counsel with opportunities to 
challenge the ways in which cases were built and executed, and claim due process rights 
for named persons.   
CSIS, the Ministers’ counsel, and arguably judges, measure the detention and 
release of suspects in terms of worst-case scenarios. When conventional risk management 
is perceived to be inadequate for securing, imagining the worst is a key alternate strategy 
(O’Malley 2011: 6-7). Imagining the worst entails ‘precautionary, ‘pre-emptive,’ or 
‘preventative’ security strategies  aimed at warding off that potential (Aradau and van 
Munster 2007: 91;  Zedner 2007; O’Malley 2011: 7-10).32 As a result, SCI risk 
                                                
32 Other measures in family of security strategies, such as resilience, assume that the ‘the worst’ can’t be 
predicted and the only appropriate counter-measure is to foster the capacity to ‘bounce back’ from 
catastrophes (see O’Connor, Boyle, Ilcan, and Oliver, 2017)). 
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management tends toward preventative measures based on speculative rather than 
calculative logics and upholds a static risk subject.  
In the face of challenges and opposition, preventative logics tend to hold steadfast 
the certainty of the threat (O’Malley, 2011: 10). Prevention does not require a “juridical 
decision for which careful consideration of evidence is necessary, but becomes an 
administrative decision, where the rule of zero-risk takes precedence” (Aradau and van 
Munster 2007: 106). As Massumi (2009) argues, non-events can never be proven, that is, 
it is impossible to know the ramifications of plots not carried out or even if suspects would 
have actually followed through. Pre-event logic “fails to respect the moral autonomy of 
the individual to choose to do right” (Zedner 2007: 273; see also Anderson, 2010; Miller 
and Morris, 1988). Speculative risk assessments are not based on the conventions of 
calculative risk, that is, predicting future behaviour based on the evidence of past actions 
of similar groups, nor are they based on thorough character assessments. Imagined 
catastrophes tend to overrule conventional approaches because, “where national security is 
involved, we must do everything possible to avert catastrophe” (Charkaoui, Re, 2004 FC 
107 (CanLII): para. 19). The lacking precedent, technical offence, and limited information 
available due to the merging of administrative and criminal processes reflects legal 
hybridity where judges are not bound by ‘hard’ law, but are able to introduce ‘soft’ 
elements (Trubek and Trubek, 2005) to their decisions; while this made arguing the cases 
difficult for open counsel, it also opened up new avenues for resisting untested law and 
precedent. The added urgency of national security and need for pre-emption supports the 
ad hoc decision making.  
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SCI suspects were initially detained in provincial jails despite habeas corpus 
applications, some in solitary/segregated for a significant portion of their detention, the 
nuanced conditions of which were heavily adjudicated. The duration of their detention 
eventually surpassed the two-year maximum for such facilities, which was challenged by 
their counsel. Following hearings on the indeterminate nature of the detention and the 
conditions of detention, the suspects were moved to the KIHC, a cluster of trailers erected 
on the grounds of Millhaven Institution, a maximum security criminal prison located in 
Bath, Ontario. The KIHC was specifically designed and constructed to hold certificate 
detainees.33 It is from this facility that four suspects were eventually granted conditional 
release.34 Despite the alarm raised by government actors advocating for the continued 
detention of the named persons, judges eventually decided that changing circumstances 
reduced the risk posed. Judges acknowledged past decisions for detention as correct and 
binding, but used dynamic situations to justify release conditions while upholding the 
impression of a static risk subject.35 
Risk and Release under the SCI 
 
Despite being administrative immigration processes, the management of SCI cases 
resembles the logic and practice of criminal justice, which, as discussed, should come with 
rights and protections not found under the SCI. The detention of suspects within criminal 
custodial facilities reinforces the spatial alignment of immigration and criminal processes. 
Several of the suspects’ legal counsels filed motions typically reserved for criminal 
proceedings in efforts to improve the condition of detention for their clients, in addition to 
                                                
33 For detailed analyses and explanation of this facility see Larsen and Piché  (2007, 2009) and Wala (2014). 
34 As a permanent resident, Mr. Charkaoui’s right to conditional release existed under the original SCI 
legislation; he was released under conditions from detention prior to the creation of the KIHC. 
35 Calavita (2010) acknowledges this as a legal strategy for politically based decisions. 
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habeas corpus applications. In some cases, immigration lawyers enlisted criminal lawyers 
as co-counsel to help navigate the SCI crimmigration procedures (on the importance of 
expertise in criminal and immigration law in crimmigration cases see Lasch (2014) and 
Lee (2015)). The work of these dedicated lawyers was important for resisting the 
legitimacy of the SCI. One respondent stated: “I would say that the successes that we have 
had were largely to the extent to which we could analogize these proceedings to criminal 
proceedings” (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). Within SCI hearings, 
judges used criminal law and criminal detention as analogues to make sense of SCI 
proceedings and detention review practices (See for example (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 3 
(CanLII)).  These determinations varied depending on the facts of the case and arguments, 
but willingness to engage criminal law attests to the ‘slippages’ and hybridity 
characteristic of crimmigration. 
In some release hearings, using criminal case analogues failed because such 
‘criminal arguments’ were deemed ‘inappropriate’ (as in Mr. Jaballah’s first release 
hearing, see Jaballah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 299 
(CanLII) para. 47). In other cases, the conditional release of suspects was referred to as 
‘bail’ (Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 10 (CanLII), para. 46). One respondent characterised SCI 
release hearings as “bail reviews writ very, very large” (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, 
January 2015). On Mr. Harkat’s first application for release from detention the conditions 
proposed were claimed to be “analogous to house arrest” (Harkat v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1740 (CanLII) para. 31). Conventional risk logic 
dictates that high-risk and dangerous offenders be subject to high levels of surveillance to 
prevent further harm. In criminal justice, house arrest, even with strict conditions, is 
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typically reserved for low-risk offenders.36  Here, there is an interplay37 where suspects 
who would typically be subject to heightened security are being released under conditions 
meant for minor offences with added strictness due to national security concerns. 
Ten of thirty-five federal judges have national security designations though none 
are assigned to national security cases on a full-time basis (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, 
December 2014). National security designation certifies that judges are experienced with, 
and understand, national security issues (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014; 
Hugessen, 2002; Mactavish, 2013). SCI legislation requires that judges with national 
security designations assess the threat posed by suspects, doing so with the help of 
correctional practitioners and expert witnesses (who have not necessarily interacted with 
suspects). A lawyer, acting as open counsel and special advocate at different times, 
suggests that the assessment of threat is based largely on “mere speculation” (Waldman, 
2009: 153). 
Experts testifying against suspects couch their assessments in erstwhile benign 
threat indicators, such as travel history and former associations, without sufficient data or 
statistics to support their assertions. While travel history is not statistically significant 
predictor of acts of terrorism outside of a risk profile involving additional factors, travel 
history was used in SCI release deliberations as circular referents in support of the 
presumption of threat with regards to Mr. Jaballah:  
                                                
36 Detailed research on house arrest is largely limited to criminal cases (see Ball, Huff, and Lilly 1988; 
Bagaric 2002; Keay 2000; Maxfield and Baumer 1990; Baumer, Maxfield, and Mendelsohn 1993; Mazey 
2002; Gibbs and King 2003; Martinovic 2010), though expanded use of ‘immigration bail’ is increasingly 
noted in literature see for example Ryo (2016). 
37 This interplay is also evidence of a “co-social ethos” (Pavlich, 2001b) characterized by a shifting terrain 
of governing rationales; for a specific discussion of the shifting 8terrain of social governance and 
governmentalities with regards to punishment practices see O’Malley (2001). 
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...it is argued that the Ministers’ position regarding the Respondent’s alleged 
presence in Afghanistan is grounded on circular reasoning. That is, the Ministers’ 
assertion that the Respondent is a member of A[l] J[ihad]38 is, in part, based on his 
alleged travel to Afghanistan. However, at the same time, [CSIS’s] conclusion that 
the Respondent travelled to Afghanistan is based, in part, on the belief that he is a 
member of AJ. (Reference re subsection 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA), 2016 FC 586 (CanLII) para. 50) 
The case against suspects involved compiling indices, each nonthreatening in themselves, 
into a predictive risk profile based on suspicion (rather than an initiating act) and the 
semblance of statistical predictability. It is in this sense that SCI cases expose the limits of 
transposing and scaling-up the criminal justice conventions in national security 
immigration cases. Aradau and van Munster (2007: 106) suggest that “when the limits of 
technical or scientific knowledge are exposed, politics discloses its own necessary 
decisionism, its immanent limit.” Knowledge is still relevant for risk management, but 
practitioner decisions are exposed as politically expedient. One respondent spoke of 
“gaps” in “a case that’s really just cobbled together with a lot of speculation [and] 
innuendo” (Interview with Yavar Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015). The necessity of probing 
the problematic content of the cases was recognized and resulted in the introduction of 
advocates to act on behalf of named persons. 
A 2007 decision from the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) rendered some 
properties of the SCI process unconstitutional (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2008] 2 SCR 326, 2008 SCC 38 (CanLII); see also Forcese and Waldman 
2007). Referred to as ‘Charkaoui I,’ this decision resulted in the introduction of ‘special 
                                                
38 An organization that has engaged in terrorism. 
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advocates’ in SCI cases. Special advocates are permitted access to the intelligence 
information used to make the case against the suspect, but are not permitted to reveal the 
information to the suspect or their open counsel without judicial leave to do so. Only a 
summary of the intelligence information is made available to the suspect and their open 
counsel. A special advocate noted that their responsibility is “to protect the interests of the 
[suspect], but once we’ve seen the intelligence we can’t communicate it…. [This] creates 
… a distortion in the way we normally do law” (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, April 
2015). The same advocate noted that, when functioning as amicus curiae (impartial 
advisor) in criminal cases or special advocate in other immigration proceedings, they are 
permitted to communicate with the defendant without judicial leave. “The concept of 
requiring leave is an artifact of the incubator of national security litigation” (Interview 
with lawyer, Toronto, April 2015), limiting the disclosure of information deemed to 
endanger either the safety of a person or national security. A recent SCC ruling stated that 
there should be robust communication between suspects their special advocates (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII)). One 
respondent noted that this “judgement is important because [it] removes the sort of 
underlying distrust of special advocates”39 (Interview with lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). 
A more robust involvement of special advocates will hopefully rectify some of the one-
sidedness of any future cases, as both named persons and their counsel struggle with 
presenting a case without a full understanding of the accusations. 
Multiple respondents commented on the importance of the accused testifying (or 
not) during their hearings and what should not be held against them, given that they were 
not privy to the secret information used against them (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, 
                                                
39 There has been no case yet put forward to test the implications of this decision. 
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December 2014; Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015; Interview with Lawyer, 
Ottawa, February 2015). Putting an individual on the stand that was unaware of the case 
against them was hazardous as there are new intermediaries that do not allow individuals 
to directly challenge the claims made by accusers, further complicating the ‘displacement’ 
or ‘othering’ already present.40 One respondent described themselves as being 
“completely hamstung” as a result of heavily redacted disclosure in a national security 
case (Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March, 2015), while another characterized it as 
“shadow-boxing” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). Not being privy to the 
case against them, they were uncertain whether their client’s testimony would alleviate 
suspicion or make the situation worse by “stepping in it” (Interview with Lawyer, January 
2015). One lawyer noted:  
In the criminal law [judges] are not entitled to draw an adverse inference. You’ve 
got the right to remain silent. The fact that you don’t testify can’t be held against 
you. On the IRPA side, there’s a compelling argument, although differently 
constructed, that you shouldn’t draw an adverse inference...because the person’s 
choice whether to testify is uninformed. (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 
2015)  
One respondent suggested that for the accused, “if you testify you’re a liar, if you don’t 
testify you’re hiding something. So, you’re screwed [either way]” (Interview with 
Activist, Ottawa, May 2015). The impression of one respondent was that such testimony 
might be “at best, completely irrelevant, and, at worst, contrary to your client’s interest” 
(Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). The tools and information available to 
                                                
40 Pavlich (2007) theorizes the “Lore” of criminal accusation (rather than “law”) suggesting that both the 
accuser and the accused provide narratives that are often overlooked as criminalizing processes. Such 
nuanced aspects of judicial processes are culturally reinforced assumptions that may be in need of reframing. 
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open counsel and special advocates were varied and contributed to their abilities and 
inabilities to protect the rights of named persons.  
Based on Mr. Charkaoui’s third hearing the judge noted that, because Mr. 
Charkaoui did not testify, it was unknown if he was willing to comply with the conditions 
of release. The judge concluded that: “it is important…to have the full participation of the 
parties in the presentation of evidence” (Charkaoui, Re, 2004 FC 1031 (CanLII), para. 
41). Testifying in their own defence became a de facto condition of a suspect’s release 
even though this testimony would be tainted by suspicion.41 In their testimony about past 
travel and their history of associations, Mr. Harkat was believed to have lied to the court, 
Mr. Mahjoub was found to be untruthful, Mr. Jaballah’s credibility was questioned, and 
Mr. Almrei was seen to be self-serving and not forthright.42 In all five cases examined, 
suspects were released once they were willing to testify even though their testimony was 
not to be believed—their subjectivity is unalterably risky.43   
While trust is a key element in being released from SCI detention this does not 
necessarily mean trust in the character of terror suspects. There are multiple factors that 
could contribute to this, but the main difference between criminal suspects and terror 
suspects is knowledge of their case. Named persons were unable to speak to the 
allegations against them, explain or justify their actions, or demonstrate their innocence, 
and, consequently, were unable to gain the trust of the Court. Instead, trust is vested in 
sureties under the auspices of Canadian Immigration and Refugee ‘performance bonds.’ 
                                                
41 In the criminal justice system remorse is an important risk marker (an index of good character), in SCI 
proceedings testimony denouncing terrorism and associated ideologies served a similar function. During his 
release hearing, Mr. Mahjoub expressed his opposition to violence and claimed to lack extremist views—he 
had not expressed his opposition in the past because, simply, he had not been asked for his views (Mahjoub 
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 171 (CanLII)). 
42 On truth telling and ‘criminal’ accusations as components of gatekeeping practices and identity formation 
see (Pavlich, 2016). 
43 For an analysis of courtrooms as a colonized space see (Razack, 1998). 
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Like other instruments used to manage the future, performance bonds are technologies to 
manage the risks posed by suspects. Performance bonds enlist community and family 
members as overseers with the aim of ensuring that former detainees meet release 
conditions by holding them responsible if they do not.  
As early as 1952, the Canadian Immigration Act authorized the conditional release 
of migrant detainees and subjected them to reporting requirements, which were supported 
by payment of a security deposit. The latter could be forfeited for failing to comply with 
any of the conditions under which the migrant was released from custody or detention 
(Immigration Act, 1952). A 1985 revision to the Immigration Act authorized performance 
bonds for the conditional release of persons from immigration detention to ensure their 
“compliance with the Act and associated regulations” upon release (Gayle v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 335 (CanLII), para. 13); failure to 
comply could also result in the forfeiture of any deposit made as a condition of the bond.   
Instruments designed to secure the conduct or performance of citizens to prevent 
untoward futures from actualizing have long existed under common law and, more 
recently, in criminal law. Such security technologies share a preventative logic. Like the 
performance bond, peace bonds are common law instruments that empowered justices to 
place persons considered to be threats to peace under bond. At its core, the common-law 
peace bond was a legal obligation to pledge monies or otherwise provide security (by 
bond or surety) in order to secure a subject’s good behaviour (R. v. Siemens, 2012 ABPC 
116 (CanLII)). Considered instruments of ‘preventative justice’ rather than of redressing 
an offence (R. v. Siemens, 2012 ABPC 116 (CanLII)), in 1997 the power of the common 
law peace bond was codified under section 810 of the Criminal Code (without negating 
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common law jurisdiction over peace bonds). Section 810 peace bonds vest criminal courts 
with the power to order a person to enter a recognizance to keep the peace when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe there is a risk of committing a violent offense. Typically 
granted in cases of where domestic violence or sexual offences are deemed probable, 
peace bonds are also used as instruments for managing the threat of terrorism, whereas:  
A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person may commit a 
terrorism offence may…lay an information before a provincial court 
judge…Satisfied by the evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable 
grounds for the fear, the judge may order that the defendant enter into a 
recognizance, with or without sureties, to keep the peace… The provincial court 
judge may add any reasonable conditions to the recognizance that the judge 
considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the defendant…. (Criminal Code, 
1985: S. 810.001 (1-6)). 
Conditions of recognizance can include electronic monitoring, house arrest or the 
requirement “to return to and remain at their place of residence at specified times” 
(Criminal Code, 1985: S. 810.011 (6)(c)), as well as restricting geographical boundaries 
(Criminal Code, 1985: S. 810.011 (10)). These provisions are deemed to enable potential 
offenders to lead “a reasonably normal life” (Humphrey and Gibbs Van Brunschot, 2015: 
388). 
Consistent with national security objectives, peace bonds are couched as 
preventive rather than punitive measures. Where conventional actuarial methods in 
criminal law use criminal records to enrol offenders in risk categories to predict future 
criminality, peace bonds do not require a criminal record or even a criminal charge. 
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Moreover, the requirement of a criminal record or some other offending conduct as a 
condition of a peace bond is seen to be at odds with its preventive purpose. In the case of 
potential child sex offenders, “insisting on a previous record for sexual offences against 
children before a recognizance can be ordered would undermine the preventive purpose of 
s. 810.1 and would require a child to be victimized before the Crown could act” (R. v. 
Budreo, 2000 CanLII 5628 (ON CA), Summary). With the aim of aiding political 
authorities in the prevention of imagined sources of harm, the test of applicability of a 
peace bond is based on a balance of probabilities rather than the conventional standard of 
reasonable doubt. Peace bond also relax the rules around evidence by allowing hearsay 
and statements not subject to cross-examination. While they are encoded in criminal law, 
peace bonds do not entail findings of guilt, they do not result in a criminal conviction, nor 
do they give rise to a criminal record. The duration of the statutory peace bond is limited 
to one year, though renewable. Common law peace bonds have no defined limit (R. v. 
Musoni, 2009 CanLII 12118 (ON SC))44. Common law peace bonds have a much broader 
scope than their statutory counterpart in that they do not have to involve concern for a 
person’s safety and can include a concern for general breaches the peace (R. v. Musoni, 
2009 CanLII 12118 (ON SC)). But, both forms of peace bonds enlist sureties to take 
responsibility for supervising an accused in the community to ensure that they do not 
engage in acts against the peace. Sureties are required to support the promise of good 
conduct (the non-event) with pledges of money. They are also responsible to obey the 
condition of the recognizance. It is up to judicial authorities to decide whether a member 
of the community is fit to act as surety, based on finances, personal character, background, 
and the cross-examination of their qualifications. 
                                                
44 In R. v. L.B. a 20-year common law peace bond was ordered (R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153 (CanLII)). 
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The transposition of the logic of common/criminal law peace bonds into the 
performance bonds of immigration security is further evidence of SCI as a crimmigration 
process, that is, a reciprocal process of enfolding criminal (and common) law measures 
into national security immigration functions. The adoption of preventative security bonds 
by criminal law also speaks to the securitization of crime control functions and the general 
blurring of common law, criminal law, and security governance functions. Under SCI 
performance bonds, members of the community are enlisted to act as sureties and help 
manage the risk or threat of terrorism. Each of the men had a group of supporters behind 
them campaigning to raise awareness of the SCI and advocating on their behalf through 
political activities such as peaceful protests, petitions, and court submissions. In addition 
to family members, some of these individuals also pledged money to support the release 
of the named persons. The measure of trust attributable to sureties is based on the veracity 
of their testimony, their understanding of the nature of the threat (albeit limited by the 
secrecy of security intelligence), and their capacity to manage that threat.  
In Mr. Harkat’s release hearing, Justice Dawson argued that the “terms and 
conditions for release must be based upon something other than Mr. Harkat’s assumed 
good faith or trustworthiness” (Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2007] 1 FCR 321, 2006 FC 628 (CanLII) para. 76). Both Mrs. Harkat and 
her mother were found to be credible sureties, but were not viewed as a having “sufficient 
controlling influence over Mr. Harkat” (Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2007] 1 FCR 321, 2006 FC 628 (CanLII), para. 81). Mr. Harkat was 
released from custody based on the sureties provided by Mrs. Harkat and seven other 
individuals. Collectively, they posted $133 000 in support of Mr. Harkat’s performance 
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while on conditional release from immigration detention, with the understanding that “if 
Mr. Harkat breaches any terms or conditions contained in the order of release, as it may 
from time to time be amended, the sums guaranteed by the performance bonds shall be 
forfeited” 45 (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1242 (CanLII), Appendix A, 3.). Release conditions 
included the equivalent of house arrest (see also Jaballah v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 379 (CanLII)), continuous electronic monitoring, 
weekly reporting to CBSA (accompanied by a surety), refraining from all electronic 
communication, allowing random CBSA visits to his residence, and that all other 
occupants of the residence agree to abide by these terms (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1242 
(CanLII)). In Mr. Harkat’s successful second application for release, dynamic risk 
assessment is evident in the consideration of changing circumstances. In criminal cases, 
dynamic risk typically involves evidential changes in the criminogenic needs of risk 
subjects, which changes their risk of reoffending. In SCI cases, the risk of a terrorist 
offence is maintained as a speculative potential and the subject is maintained as a static 
risk and a perpetual threat to peace. The dynamic character of risk assessment and 
management is tied to surveillant functions, both of official agencies and the community 
sureties willing to serve as bonded functionaries of risk management. Within the SCI 
cases it is not a matter of managing the causes of potential engagement in terrorist actions, 
but of adequate monitoring to prevent acts and unauthorized communication.  
Take for example the risk mitigation considerations undertaken for Mr. Jaballah: 
At his release hearing, having been in security detention for more than 5½ years, Mr. 
Jaballah’s wife was not considered a credible surety, nor suited to act as primary 
                                                
45 IRCC and CBSA managers and officers have discretionary power to decide whether a breach of 
conditions is severe enough to warrant the forfeiture of the deposit or the guarantee. 
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supervisor, having, under cross-examination, “previously lied to the court regarding her 
husband’s travels” and having “not been honest regarding Mr. Jaballah’s association with 
certain individuals before coming to Canada” (Jaballah v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 379 (CanLII), para. 61). The court also held that, 
because Mr. Jaballah’s wife was supported by public assistance, she “did not have the means 
to post a cash bond to secure her husband’s release” (Jaballah v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 379 (CanLII), para. 59). The judge in the case 
concluded that “I need to be able to trust her to properly supervise Mr. Jaballah to ensure his 
compliance with the conditions of release.  My capacity to repose such trust in her is severely 
compromised” (Jaballah v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 
FC 379 (CanLII), para. 64). In the end, however, the judge concluded that onerous release 
conditions went a long way to counter-balancing this “supervisory deficiency” (Jaballah v. 
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 379 (CanLII), para. 69). 
Mr. Jaballah was released on conditions ‘equivalent to house arrest,’ video surveillance of 
his property, electronic monitoring, random CBSA visitations, restricted home visitations 
to listed parties, and $99 250 in forfeitable funds posted, including seven individuals 
executing performance bonds.  
In Mr. Mahjoub’s third and successful release hearing, Mr. Mahjoub’s wife and 
step-son were believed in their testimony and were found to be credible sureties. 
Previously, the court found that, other than his wife, none of the other sureties had “known 
Mr. Mahjoub well, or for a long period of time” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Mahjoub, [2004] 1 FCR 493, 2003 FC 928 (CanLII) para. 77). In Mr. 
Mahjoub’s case, affidavits from multiple community supporters aided his application for 
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release from security detention with $58 000 raised in performance bonds, on top of $32 
500 deposited cash bonds. While the threat was not sufficiently redressed by sureties, it 
was found that it could be managed through a combination of surveillance by the bonded 
functionaries, and additional technological monitoring by CBSA. 
Mr. Almrei had more trouble obtaining release because he did not have any family 
in the country. Despite having multiple sureties, none could reside with Mr. Almrei and 
provide round-the-clock supervision that were conditions of Messrs. Harkat, Mahjoub, 
Jaballah, and Charkaoui’s conditional release.46 Upon his fourth application, Justice 
Mosely granted Mr. Almrei release based on the assumption that performance sureties 
would be sufficient to manage the risk when bolstered with technological monitoring.  
The enlistment of community members in support of national security (and crime 
control) efforts is well documented and community vigilance is seen as a key component 
of contemporary risk management strategies (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Reeves, 
2012). This vigilance is often linked to publicity strategies to make the community aware 
of risks (as in Megan’s Law and the publication of known offender registries)47 so that 
entire neighbourhoods and community networks can serve as instruments of soft 
surveillance. Enlisting members of the public as security-bonded functionaries adds a 
measure of responsiblization (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Reeves, 2012) to these 
preventative efforts. While responsiblization may be seen as the government avoiding its 
obligations, it is also an expression of political agency on behalf of the individuals taking 
on such roles. Familial bonded functionaries have an additional stake in the conformity of 
                                                
46 Being a permanent resident, Mr. Charkaoui had a right to conditional release with less-stringent 
conditions than the provisional release afforded the other suspects under immigration security performance 
bonds.   
47  For a discussion of risk knowledge and Megan's Law see Valverde, Levi, and Moore (2005). 
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suspects as they agree to share in managing risks to national security on threat of financial 
penalties (forfeiture of bonds). That is, supporters in the community and family have put 
forward significant amounts of money and family members make significant personal 
sacrifices in lifestyle and privacy in order to ensure the continued release of their loved-
one (see Larsen, Harkat, and Harkat, 2008). Judicial authorities may employ their 
professional judgement in determining the risk thresholds of their bonded functionaries, 
but they also see sureties as important instruments in managing public security through 
‘soft surveillance.’ 
Key to the successful SCI release from immigration detention is the ability to 
provide trustworthy and monetarily invested sureties. This reflects a significant emphasis 
on soft surveillance (rather than changes in the riskiness of suspects) as a condition of 
release. The testimony of suspects, while a de facto condition of their release, is set 
against their position as static risk-subjects, as not credible, and insufficiently remorseful. 
Though trustworthy domestic/familial bonds are important, the oversight of a broader 
collection of community functionaries plays a significant role managing national security. 
Release considerations also involve overt ‘eyes-on’ surveillance by the CBSA and forms 
of physical surveillance of their person, premises, and communications. However, noting 
the fallibility of technological monitoring, several judges consider hard surveillance as 
only bolstering the soft surveillance of bonded functionaries.  
In all SCI cases, release conditions slowly eased over time. Cameras were 
removed, CBSA monitored computer access and cell phones were permitted, and Messrs. 
Harkat, Mahjoub, and Jaballah were eventually allowed to remain unsupervised in their 
residences. The easing of surveillance reflects the significance of ongoing risk 
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assessments and the dynamic nature of circumstances, as well as continued advocacy by 
open counsel. In rulings on their release conditions, judges claimed that trust was being 
rewarded by less stringent conditions. Trust plays an important role in the economy of 
national security threats. Attempts to reduce soft surveillance by relinquishing 
performance bonds were less successful. In 2010, Mr. Jaballah’s release conditions were 
relaxed, but the performance bond remained in force. The court agreed to the removal on 
one surety with the provision that a replacement be found given the opinion that “the 
execution of performance bonds continues to provide an additional incentive for Mr. 
Jaballah to comply with all of the conditions of release” (Jaballah (Re), 2009 FC 284 
(CanLII) para. 77). In 2015, a judge in the case of Mr. Mahjoub ruled that “the danger to 
the security of Canada has not evaporated; it remains latent, perceptible, and factual” 
(Mahjoub (Re), 2015 FC 1232 (CanLII), para. 78). While some of release conditions were 
relaxed, the conditions of keeping the peace and being of good behaviour and the 
conditions associated with performance bonds were to remain in force (Mahjoub (Re), 
2015 FC 1232 (CanLII)). 
Conclusion  
 
The implementation of speculative risk can be considered a success in that thus far 
no released named persons have engaged in terrorist activity. However, the cost of pre-
emptive security is not isolated to the accused. One respondent referred to release 
conditions as a “death by a thousand cuts” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 
2015): the intrusions in the lives of their families were incredibly difficult. Acting as 
surety, Mr. Harkat’s wife has likened herself to a jailer, having to be in constant 
supervision of her husband, while at the same time living in constant fear of being in 
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breach of release conditions (Larsen et al., 2008; Wala, 2014). She would be unlikely to 
consider her oversight functions as easier to manage than the hard surveillance of CSC or 
CBSA. While judges claim that house arrest conditions do not infringe upon the liberty of 
individuals as significantly as detention, Mr. Mahjoub had his sureties voluntarily 
withdraw their bonds because the release conditions were too intrusive on his family 
(Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mahjoub, 2009 FC 439 (CanLII)). He was 
subsequently returned to the KIHC.48 These stringent release conditions are preventative, 
pre-event undertakings that appropriate crime control technologies, like house arrest, and 
deploy them within immigration proceedings without the corresponding logic related to 
managing low-risk populations and rehabilitation needs. Instead, risks and threats to 
national security are managed in the community through bonded functionaries. Based in 
immigration law, but combining elements of common and criminal law peace bonds, 
performance bonds are attempts to “‘tame’ the limit and govern what appears to be 
ungovernable” (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 107), that is, “incidents that have a low 
level of frequency of occurrence” (MacAlister, 2005: 38). 
In this case, the hybridity of the SCI as a national security assemblage is reflected 
in the merging of conventional civil, administrative, and criminal law practices. Evident is 
the movement of “ideas and practices across discrete sites and institutional boundaries” 
(Walters, 2017: 9). The use of bonded functionaries to manage the future in cases of 
suspected terrorism shows the shifting use of community sanctions as risk assessments are 
implemented in civil, criminal, and immigration/administrative cases; it only follows that 
peace bonds would be used in legal hybrids created by yoking these legal systems (Trubek 
                                                
48 One respondent made the remark that: “my spousal relationship would not survive, I am quite confident, if 
my partner had to be with me all of the time” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). 
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and Trubek, 2005). Community supervision seems a soft form of intervention for persons 
suspected of acts of terrorism, but is nevertheless the preferred option in cases where a 
breach of national security is suspected but no offence is made known or proven by 
conventional judicial standards. This approach to risk management is evidence of the 
unique assemblage of crimmigration proceedings, non-events, suspicion and intelligence, 
combined with the bypassing of rights and recycled forms of criminal case management. 
In this assemblage, SCI judges are precariously cast as petty sovereigns (Butler, 2004) to 
the extent that the release outcome is an administrative decision, not a typical judicial 
decision arrived at after careful consideration of evidence derived by conventional rules 
(See Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Instead of evidence, the administration of risk takes 
on a speculative form, neither completely actuarial or categorical, and renders the future 
actionable and manageable by responsibilizing members of the community to manage the 
threat of terrorism. Rather than speculative risk being in a binary relationship with other 
forms of risk, it incorporates several competing risk logics. 
 Trubek and Trubek (2005: 361) view components of legal approaches as not 
mutually incompatible and argue that “perhaps the most promising ideas” would come 
from combining legal methods. However, there must be an awareness of the ‘problems’ as 
outcomes of governance, in addition to the ‘goods’ (Burris et al., 2005). The SCI provides 
a recent example of hoc instrumentalism (Sklansky, 2012) where judges reluctantly set 
precedent for acts that are not technically immigration-based, could fall under the criminal 
code, but are not being pursued as crimes. This is not to suggest that the criminal justice 
system and use of the Anti-Terrorism Act  (2001) is a remedy for unrestrained governing 
in the post-9/11 environment as law increasingly becomes securitized and justice is lost in 
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an age of security without punishment (Shearing and Johnston, 2005). However, ‘function 
creep’ (Legomsky, 2007) is a concern with the creation of this new type of crimmigration 
proceedings. Under function creep, governing technologies are used for purposes outside 
of its initial conceptualization (as is the case with criminal enforcement in immigration 
law and immigration enforcement in criminal law). The expanded use of offence-less risk 
assessments and peace bonds could/should be a problem, but when they are being used to 
ameliorate conditions of indeterminate detention they appear as a good. While the SCI’s 
governance of detainment and release has succeeded in preventing named persons from 
engaging in terrorist acts, the efficiency of legal hybridity comes at the expense of 





Chapter II: Simulated Justice: Intelligence as evidence in immigration security 
Introduction 
 
The Security Certificate Initiative (SCI) is an immigration administrative counter-
terrorism measure applicable to non-citizens; it makes use of ‘inadmissibility’ 
designations on the grounds of national security concerns to permanently banish non-
citizens from Canada. The process is initiated by the issuance of a certificate signed by the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).49 The issuance allows for long-term detention 
pending deportation and banishment (Bigo, 2006) of non-citizen terror suspects based on 
‘secret evidence’ (Diab, 2015) and requires that there be “reasonable grounds to believe 
they have engaged in terrorism, are a member of an organization that has or will engage in 
terrorism, or that they generally pose a danger to the security of Canada” (Diab, 2015: 98). 
Used to expedite the deportation and banishment of non-citizen terror suspects, lawyers 
and social justice advocates have challenged certificates in protracted legal battles, 
resulting in proceedings dropped by the Government or quashed by judges. The failure to 
ensure the swift and certain deportation of suspect non-citizens is due in part to attempts at 
using secret or classified intelligence as evidence in court proceedings—what is referred 
to as the judicialization of intelligence. Through analysis of interviews and court 
documents, this chapter offers an examination of the use of intelligence as evidence in 
efforts to enact simulated justice. Specifically, it argues that using intelligence in the 
courts perverts just outcomes typically sought in such spaces. 
                                                
49 Previously Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 
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In criminal law, evidence is a crucial component of justice processes. It is the 
threshold used to determine whether a crime has taken place. Moreover, criminal charges 
are not laid unless prosecutors, acting on behalf of the government, believe there is 
sufficient evidence to prove, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that a crime has been 
committed. While there are significant parallels between criminal law and certificate 
cases, there are also key differences. These differences are reflected in the simulation of 
evidence. SCI cases are not supported by evidence in the conventional sense, and 
references to evidence are nostalgic appreciation of what is no more. Simulation is 
pretending to have what you do not have and involves the negation of the real 
(Baudrillard, 1994). It signifies the absence (of an offence) and substitution by something 
else (‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a future offence is possible). In this way, 
simulated evidence references the demise of real evidence in a post-event system of 
justice made obsolete by pre-event security initiatives. Certificates aims to act on that 
which has not happened, that is, on imagined sources of harm. Under the SCI, simulation 
generates ‘zones of indistinction’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2003) where stand-ins for 
accepted legal processes no longer represent the real as they have been so thoroughly 
transformed. 
This chapter suggests that there exists a zone of indistinction, generated by 
potentiality, that makes reality imperceptible from mimicry. Baudrillard's (1994) idea of 
simulation offers a framework for understanding how the rule of law and the judicial order 
of the SCI is comprehended. Building upon these ideas allows for elaboration on how 
intelligence is understood (and misunderstood) as evidence in court proceedings. It is clear 
that summarized information has limits within the court, though special advocates extend 
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some of those limits, they are frustrated in some of their powers of doing so. This chapter 
offers a discussion of why intelligence has been judicialized and taken up in the courts, in 
addition to why it is seen to be necessary within these cases. A discussion of how the 
limited abilities (inequality of arms) of the special advocates contribute to the zone of 
indistinction due to rules around CSIS witnesses is then offered. Finally, the chapter 
proposes an explanation of why secrecy is necessary for national security and the 
limitation and negative ramifications of the SCI for citizens and non-citizens alike. This 
chapter’s main contribution, thus, is to provide a framework for understanding the role of 
intelligence in the courtroom and how the SCI has transformed evidentiary rules with 
concerning results for rights. 
Methodology 
 
This chapter is part of a project that investigates the SCI through interviews and 
document analysis. Twenty interviews were carried out with individuals working in 
varying capacities within the SCI. Interview respondents included: open counsel; special 
advocates; individuals who have acted as both open counsel and special advocates; a 
member of the judiciary; individuals working in the area of human rights, advocacy, 
and/or as community activists; legal scholars; a journalist who has extensively covered 
national security issues; and a representative of the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA). A representative of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) 
replied to questions through email. Representatives from IRCC and Public Safety Canada 
(PSC) declined interviews because of “ongoing litigation.” Correctional Service Canada 
(CSC) declined to interview because CBSA was the appropriate ‘detaining authority’ at 
the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre. No responses were received from the 
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provincial detention centres involved in the immigration detention nor from those who 
acted as Ministers’ counsel. The court documents considered are the Reasons for Decision 
in the certificate cases of Adil Charkaoui, Mahmoud Jaballah, Hassan Almrei, Mohammad 
Mahjoub, and Mohamed Harkat. 
Theoretical Intervention 
 
Emergency measures are a part of the everyday exercise of powers that work 
cohesively with, rather than in opposition to, the rule of law (Neocleous, 2006). Using 
Agamben's (1998) idea of the exception as a constant biopolitical structure that has existed 
since antiquity and intensified during modernity, Lundborg (2016) emphasizes a zone of 
indistinction between potentiality and actuality. Understood as a political structure,50 
homo sacer is beyond both penal law and divine law where the homo sacer’s killing is 
unpunishable, yet not a sacrifice; however, the figure of ‘bare life’ is subject to the rule of 
sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). The emphasis on potentiality is evident in the 
suggestion that “If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is 
perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri” (Agamben, 1998: 115, emphasis in 
original). The potential to be excluded from a political existence by means of the 
exception is a consequence of the goal of biopolitical forms of control that seek to 
preempt the potential of dangerousness (Dillon, 2003; Lundborg, 2016; Peerenboom, 
2004). Here, potentiality is understood as “the presence of an absence” or the “potential to 
not-do” rather than something that is had (Agamben, 1999: 179-180). In other words, it is 
recognized that there is a capacity for terror suspects to not act dangerously (Dillon, 2003) 
just as there is a the potential for sovereign acts to not actualize exclusion. It is important 
                                                
50 Or what Agamben (2005) refers to as a ‘paradigm of government.’ 
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to note that all members of Western political communities are marked by the potential for 
exclusion. Baudrillard's (1994) idea of simulation poses that copies of copies create a 
disconnect between copy and model leading to a distorted perception of the reality of 
dangers and causes a “vicious circle of increased security/insecurity” (Lundborg, 2016).  
Following Baudrillard's (1994) simulation provides an approach to thinking 
through the limits of juridical order. The rule of law is a form of juridical order under 
which laws are equally applied to all members of society. Within such a system as the rule 
of law, the juridical order is said to exist as a meaningful constraint on the authority of 
both state actors and the social elite (Peerenboom, 2004). This chapter suggests that the 
equality of the rule of law is a spectre haunting emergency measures, executive rule and 
discretion through a desire for the return to illusory restraints on government excess. Even 
within democratic states, most legislation contains provisions for exercising exceptional 
powers that negate the rule of law even when not enacted. While liberal governance seeks 
to separate emergency rule from the normal juridical order, historical evidence suggests 
that emergency powers are far from exceptional; rather, they are an ongoing aspect of 
normal political rule (Neocleous, 2006). Within colonial regimes, exceptions and the rule 
of law were enacted alongside each other unencumbered where rules differed, including 
for internment, depending on whether one was a ‘Native subject’ or a ‘French citizen’ (Le 
Cour Grandmaison, 2006). Such practices are indicative of a firmly entrenched foundation 
for the suspension of the rule of law where colonizers as rights holders live alongside the 
bare life of natives. Under the SCI, which is applicable only to non-citizens, simulated 
evidence is adequate; such degraded evidentiary standards are not acceptable in legal 
proceedings that apply to Canadian citizens.  
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The SCI reflects simulation that allows us to talk about what has not happened 
with there being ‘levels’ of simulation following Baudrillard (1994); pretending to have 
what one does not is merely one level of many forms of simulation. In addition to the non-
offence being pursued, as with Baudrillard's (1994) robbery, the effects of (potentially 
total) security are simulated within the SCI (See Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Under the SCI 
security officials read pieces of intelligence as signs for terrorist acts that had the potential 
to occur (until the named persons were apprehended). As Baudrillard (1994: np) indicates 
a “fake holdup” can never be perfectly simulated because “the network of artificial signs 
will become inextricably mixed up with real elements” and will have real consequences.51 
Here the response to the non-offence generates ‘real’ consequences of an actual offence 
via the detainment of named persons. For Baudrillard (1994: np) even the real “is no 
longer really the real” it is a hyperreal. The detainment of named persons reflects the lost 
referents of rehabilitation, punishment, and even prevention. While the criminal justice 
system involves signifiers and referents of justice, the exchange of evidence for 
intelligence compounds the level of the hyperreal. The rule of law is an absent presence 
and, as a persistent referent, a presentified absence that plagues perceptions of justice. 
The publicity of the SCI indicates a level of deterrence by showing that terrorists 
in Canada will be detected and deported. However, this is simulation as it cannot be 
known what, if anything, has been prevented (See Massumi, 2009). Rather than a ‘real’ 
deterrent effect, the SCI acts as a political tool52 for simulating the effect of security.53 One 
respondent noted this occurrence: “I think this was a way for the Government to 
                                                
51 For a recent example of this see The Associated Press (2017). 
52 Amicelle, Aradau, and Jeandesboz (2015) make a similar suggestion with regards to security devices 
having political effects. 
53 Security responses are just one of a panoply of images associated with 9/11 (Engle, 2009). 
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demonstrate: ‘look we’re doing our part. We’re using these counter-terrorism tools.’ 
[However,] it’s not making us any safer. It doesn’t actually prevent any actual violence” 
(Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015). One respondent spoke of the SCI as an 
expression of prowess rather than having a basis in actually securing: “I do think that there 
was something performative about the certificate and I think that, in part, because of the 
way in which they were publicized and talked about and made part of…the Government’s 
very public response” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). The deterrent 
effect of the SCI is impossible to know because its effectiveness is evident only in the 
non-event of terrorism. Just as there is no evidentiary proof of terrorism in these cases, 
there is no referential for the security the SCI generates. The political positionality of 
homo sacer in a zone of indistinction provides us with an understanding of the legal 
ambiguity of the SCI while simulation offers an appreciation of the lack of ‘reality’ within 
these cases due to the replacement of evidence with intelligence in the court room. 
Information: Intelligence v. evidence 
 
The terminology used in reference to the material upon which certificates are 
based varies among those working in different capacities under the SCI as well as within 
government documentation. A report evaluating the SCI explains,  
The security certificate process is an immigration proceeding used to detain and 
remove from Canada non-Canadians deemed inadmissible on grounds of security, 
violating human rights, serious criminality or organized criminality when the 
determination is based on classified evidence that, if disclosed publicly, would be 
injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person. (Public Safety 
Canada, 2010; italics added) 
 
 58 
However, Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which lays 
out the SCI legislation, refers frequently to “information or other evidence” and 
“information and other evidence,” suggesting that there are differences between evidence 
and information.54 The consistent slippage and interchangeability suggests that there is a 
problem with evidence as referent for what is being utilized under the SCI and exemplifies 
the zone of indistinction with regards to what ‘counts’ in these proceedings. Hybridity in 
law (Trubek and Trubek, 2005) contributes to imprecise definitions that result from 
intelligence being judicialized. 
Under Division 9, information is defined as “security or criminal intelligence 
information and information that is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, the 
government of a foreign state, an international organization of states or an institution of 
such a government or international organization” (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, 2001, S. 76). One interpretation is that information becomes evidence under the SCI 
proceedings when the judge receives it into evidence; Section 83.1(g) of Division 9 gives 
judges the power to admit into evidence anything that they deem reliable and 
appropriate55—making judges the sovereign authority. Unlike criminal cases, relying on 
hearsay is acceptable. Precedent reflects that what is ‘appropriate’ equates to being useful 
and ‘reliability’ denotes trustworthiness (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 84). 
According to Parliament, evidence obtained through torture is not reliable and appropriate 
for use in certificate cases.56 Attempts to ensure quality material is relied upon for 
                                                
54 Roach (2010: 53-55) provides a useful chart outlining the competing norms and assumptions of ideal 
types of intelligence and evidence. 
55 Within court documents cases are based on what is referred to as “information and other evidence.” 
56 According to Mr. Young’s court testimony, CSIS does not rely on information obtained through torture. 
However, information obtained from the Gauntánamo Bay detention camp has been knowingly used. It was 




decision-making is apparent, but in conjunction with the “reasonable grounds to believe” 
standard of proof,57 the rigorousness of the process is uncertain. There is no strict 
parameter by which to determine something to be ‘evidence,’ making the process 
indistinct. One respondent noted: “The standard of proof in these immigration cases 
is…virtually meaningless: sort of; a hunch; maybe; I guess so. I mean, it’s a very, very 
low, almost supercilious standard” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). In 
conjunction with concerns about the SCI process, the rigorousness of the information 
vetting done by CSIS was questioned by multiple respondents, suggesting that the 
Ministers have never had anything that qualifies as evidence; to them, information merely 
stands in as ‘evidence.’ 
While SCI proceedings take place in court, it is not widely accepted that the cases 
are based on evidence as it is typically understood and explicitly legislated under the 
Canada Evidence Act (CEA). Under the heading “International Relations and National 
Defence and National Security,” Section 38.06(3.1) of the CEA, the presiding judge has 
the power to receive anything that they find acceptable into evidence (Canada Evidence 
Act, 1985). Despite this legislative allowance, multiple respondents indicated that they did 
not accept what was being presented under the SCI as ‘evidence.’ “I don’t like to use the 
word ‘evidence’ because it’s not necessarily evidence as we know it. It’s material” 
(Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 2015). Under the SCI, the parameters for what 
makes up the Ministers’ case is slippery at best; actors speak of ‘evidence,’ ‘information,’ 
‘intelligence,’ and ‘material’ in reference to the same documents.58 The inability to agree 
                                                
57 This standard is explained as “more than mere suspicion, but is less stringent than the criminal standard” 
(Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 (CanLII), para. 62). 
58 The difference between ‘inference’ and ‘speculation’ is key to the differentiation of intelligence and 
evidence. According to Justice Hansen, ‘inference’ is deduced from evidence and based on established facts, 
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upon what makes up the cases against named persons is indication of added abstraction to 
Baudrillard's (1994) already referential ‘real,’ where legal innovation adds to the zone of 
indistinction between actuality and potentiality as ‘something else’ stands in for evidence. 
One approach to differentiating between intelligence and evidence is by how it is 
used: intelligence is used for advanced warning about individuals, and evidence is used for 
legal purposes (Roach, 2010, 2012). This differentiation is acceded to, but this chapter 
acknowledges that evidence and intelligence differ as processes59 and note that 
intelligence is increasingly being used in criminal cases. Evidence as a “process” has a 
chain of custody that cannot be compromised—otherwise it no longer qualifies as 
evidence. This chain of custody must be carefully documented and it is only in making it 
public that evidence ‘counts.’ Intelligence is the opposite—it may have an unclear chain 
of custody, sometimes quite intentionally. Intelligence is compromised and loses its power 
when it is made public.60 The implementation of these two opposing concepts to achieve 
the same end is an indication of Baudrillard’s (1994) conception of simulation, where 
symbols replace reality and copies become indistinguishable from originals, making a 
space that lacks clarity and creating potentialities abound. Regardless of how it is 
conceptualized, it is clear that there is an active relation between evidence and intelligence 
                                                                                                                                             
while ‘speculation’ requires a ‘leap of faith’ (Jaballah (Re), 2016 FC 586, para. 14). The Ministers argued 
that Mr. Almrei’s honey and incense business was being used to obtain funds for financing terrorism and 
Justice Mosely decided that “The Service then drew certain inferences from that information which, in my 
view, were not well-founded” (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 433). Similarly, Justice Hansen 
found the case for Mr. Jaballah’s involvement in military conflict in Afghanistan and Al Jihad to not reach 
the threshold for reasonable inferences (Jaballah (Re), 2016 FC 586, paras. 59, 68). 
59 Various authors suggest that intelligence is a process (See Lippert and O’Connor, 2006; Robinson, 2009; 
Sheptycki, 2004; Taplin, 1989; Wheaton and Beerbower, 2006). There is no singular accepted definition of 
‘intelligence.’ This complicates theorizing (Warner, 2007) and coordinating (Wheaton and Beerbower, 
2006). 
60 Intelligence under the SCI includes CSIS sources, third party reports, telecommunications intercepts, 
physical surveillance reports, and information from the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), IRCC, 
and the CBSA. “In the present context, ‘intelligence’ refers to the product resulting from the collection, 
collation, evaluation and analysis of information with respect to issues covered under the CSIS mandate” 
(Government of Canada, 2015). 
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(Roach, 2012). Following Baudrillard (1994), the Ministers are feigning to have what they 
do not through summaries,61 but continue to reference it as evidence out of nostalgia for 
what has been lost. 
Summaries of Summaries: Simulation and parity of information 
 
As noted above, in the SCI cases, evidence is whatever the presiding judge admits 
as such. One respondent explains, “So there could be a variety of sources and a range of 
reliability of sources, from the purely conjectural up to the eyewitness-type account, 
perhaps by a highly reliable human source” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 
2015). However, sometimes it is merely “a summary of a summary of a summary” where 
the CSIS witness presenting the summary has had no firsthand contact with the named 
person or the material that they are presenting as evidence (Interview with Lawyer, 
Ottawa, April 2015). This characterization is profoundly parallel to a level of simulation 
where duplicates, doubles, and copies stand in, making the original indistinguishable from 
its mimicry. Judicial deference to the executive in cases of confidential information and 
national security in general is a concerning trend noted by multiple authors (See 
Macfarlane, 2012; Rankin, 1986) and respondents as noted later. With so much 
summarizing taking place the referent information may become lost as the provenance of 
the information already is or becomes unknown. CSIS’s function as a domestic (rather 
than international) intelligence gathering agency is part of this issue as it makes Canada 
heavily reliant on information from other domestic and some foreign intelligence 
                                                
61 Baudrillard (1994) notes that simulating is not the same as pretending; with simulation, the difference 




agencies.62 CSIS’s foreign involvement is limited to cooperation with foreign partners and 
comes with caveats for how much is known about provenance and how the information is 
used. 
Different knowledges are accepted as “legally authentic” depending on the source 
of information, with revelatory knowledge from investigators being more acceptable in 
court than offered knowledge from laypersons (Green, 1997). Such privileged knowledge 
of investigators is difficult to challenge according to Green (1997). A lack of offered or 
lay knowledge from the named person and other fully informed witnesses prevents equal 
presentation on both sides of the SCI cases. Layers are added to the simulation of just 
proceedings given the inequity of information within the courtroom. Multiple respondents 
noted that special advocates are supposed to challenge what is brought forward by 
Minister’s counsel, but are unable to produce their own evidence creating a deficit in the 
parity of SCI proceedings. According to one respondent, “the day when that finally comes, 
that a special advocate asks to present evidence, is going to be a make-it-up-as-you-go-
along process” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). The lack of exculpatory 
information is a significant concern for many respondents and was noted as an issue in 
some Reasons for Decisions. Not only is there no evidence brought forward by special 
advocates, but Ministers’ counsel did not initially present all [exculpatory] information to 
the judges or special advocates.63 Further, while the special advocates have access to the 
closed information, they do not necessarily get to know the provenance of the information, 
which the Ministers may or may not have, in addition to the ability to inquire about 
                                                
62 The United States has both a domestic (the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) and a foreign (the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)) intelligence agency.  
63 Justice Mosely viewed the Ministers’ stance that they were not required to present contradictory evidence 
as “incompatible with the duties of good faith and candour which the Court expects from the Service and the 
Ministers” (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 501). 
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provenance (Mahjoub (Re), 2010 FC 787 (CanLII), para. 58). The disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence was a concern in the cases as it was only brought forward once 
ordered by the Court (See for example Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 502). 
The precarious position of the special advocates and their limited powers contributes to 
the indistinctness of the SCI as it exists as a court proceedings. Even where there is 
information that is publicly disclosed, the dependability is uncertain. 
The Charkaoui II ruling is very explicit in its expression of there being varying 
qualities of evidence: “There is no question that original notes and recordings are the best 
evidence” (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 2 SCR 326, 2008 
SCC 38 (CanLII), para. 49). The emphasis placed on the idea of an ‘original’ is akin to 
Baudrillard's (1994) simulation in that translations and transpositions deplete the initial 
iteration of evidence. Some of the SCI cases rely upon the summaries made by 
intelligence officials that have passed through multiple transpositions. Justice Hansen 
expressed concerns over Mr. Jaballah’s CSIS interviews being conducted in English 
despite his limited proficiency (Jaballah (Re), 2016 FC 586). Within Mr. Harkat’s case, 
some interviews and conversations were translated into English, summarized, and then 
entered into the CSIS data bank; Federal Court of Appeal judges found that “The three 
human interventions generated a possibility of errors, inaccuracies or distortions” (Harkat 
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 123). The 
dependence on summaries within these cases is a consequence of the use of intelligence 
for which it is CSIS protocol to destroy any original documentation leaving behind only 
copies and double copies (Baudrillard, 1994) to stand in.64 Many years have passed 
                                                
64 Justice Létourneau notes that CSIS was acting in good faith and following policy when they destroyed the 
original information, but this was a breach of duty under the section 7 of the Charter and prevented the 
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between the intelligence iterations leading to CSIS witnesses having minimal recollection 
of interviews without prompting from the summaries, leaving the reliability of the 
summaries in question (See Jaballah (Re), 2016 FC 586, para. 55). Errors and 
discrepancies are not necessarily apparent to special advocates and judges leaving the 
accuracy entirely unverifiable (Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 
FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 133). 
Justice Létourneau determined that disclosure of the non-redacted CSIS summaries 
to the special advocates was not a remedy for the original material not being available 
because “The summaries are the remnants of the destroyed originals. They are the 
problem, not the solution” (Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 
122 (CanLII), para. 132). The decision was made to exclude the summaries of 
conversations that Mr. Harkat was not privy to. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) it was decided that even though the destruction of CSIS operational 
materials was a breach of section 7 of the Charter, the summaries were adequate for Mr. 
Harkat to know and meet the case against him and did not have prejudicial effect (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), 2014); 
such decisions provide legitimacy to the stand ins and contribute to the blurriness of the 
SCI by acknowledging the problem of copies, but not rectifying it. It seems that the Court 
found Mr. Harkat untrustworthy and “was unprepared to reward Mr. Harkat with a 
meaningful remedy” (Interview with Craig Forcese, Ottawa, October 2014). Professor 
Forcese considers this decision as a win for clarifying the system, but an individual loss 
for Mr. Harkat. In 2016, Mr. Jaballah was granted an abuse of process motion that led to 
                                                                                                                                             
named person from knowing and meeting the case against him and precluded the function of judicial review 
(Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 125). 
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the exclusion of all summaries for which original material had been destroyed (Jaballah 
(Re), 2016 FC 586, paras. 7-9). The selectiveness of what ‘counts’ as evidence indicates 
an end of adherence to stringent evidentiary parameters as laid out in the CEA and the 
privileging of mimicked (Baudrillard, 1994) evidence. 
The contentiousness of summaries speaks to a concern for the lack of reality 
embedded in them. The SCI process advances in the courts as if following the ‘real’ just 
processes of the criminal justice system (though not really real justice, but rather 
Baudrillard's (1994) hyperreal), while the underlying mechanisms indicate the acceptance 
of truncated information as evidence. Some respondents spoke directly to the authenticity 
of the cases: one noted the lack of “real” evidence and “real” ability of the lawyers to 
challenge information, while characterizing the public trials as a façade, a piece of show, 
and not the “real deal” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 2015). A lawyer and 
outspoken critic of the SCI portrayed the process in a variety of ways suggesting that the 
public court proceedings are “an insanity circle” and like being “in Alice in Wonderland” 
(Interview with Rocco Galati, Toronto, June 2015). More subdued characterizations by 
Mr. Galati indicate that the process is a sham that is all smoke and mirrors (Interview, 
Toronto, June 2015). Regardless of the words used, such descriptions suggest that the SCI 
merely provides the pretense of judicial proceedings—simulation and mimicry—rather 
than one that respondents understand as genuine. The implementation of the Special 
Advocate Program (SAP) was meant to rectify some of the concerns with one-sided 
justice, however, as we will see, constraints to these security-cleared lawyers cause added 
layers to the courtroom process that further simulate justice. The references to the ‘real’ 
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by respondents is suggestive of genuine justice as a spectre haunting the discourse around 
the SCI out of nostalgia for what has been lost to the hyperreal. 
Special Advocates and the Semblance of Legality  
 
In response to the Charkaoui I ruling that the IRPA inadmissibility scheme was 
unconstitutional, special advocates were introduced and the SCC reasoned the scheme was 
constitutionally compliant. This was done by ensuring that suspects are “reasonably 
informed” of the case against them and that there is sufficient disclosure of information to 
enable the suspect to “give meaningful instructions” to their public counsel (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), para. 
56). Under the IRPA scheme, broad judicial discretion and assigning special advocates to 
cases are imagined as “substantial substitutes” and “alternative means” for the functions 
normally attributed to ordinary counsel in public legal proceedings (Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), summary). Normal 
rules of disclosure and evidentiary safeguards ensure that defendants and their counsel 
know the case made against them, can cross-examine information, and are protected by 
rules against hearsay. IRPA exceptions are analogous to the common-law privilege 
granted to confidential informants (CI) in criminal cases and commissions of inquiry. This 
“informer privilege” has long been recognized in common law and serves a dual purpose, 
namely, to protect “a channel of information and the safety of those supplying it” (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), para. 
115). However, the use of informants in SCI cases does involve different rules and 
restricted knowledge for special advocates whose role it is to bolster the parity of 
information and ensure justice. 
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While CSIS informants are not granted the same blanket privilege as CIs, the 
information they provide is. This information is secured under broad protections that 
preclude the public disclosure of information injurious to national security interests. As 
one respondent noted there is no class privilege, rather just national security privilege 
(Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). The de facto extension of the common 
privilege establishes that even special advocates are granted only a limited ability to 
interview and cross examine CSIS informants, and only as a last resort. This variation is 
not representative of the protections and openness of the criminal justice system. One 
respondent summed up the difference between witnesses in criminal cases and witnesses 
under the SCI: 
in the criminal law context, the police have informants…but if the informant’s 
information is going to be used to affect a person’s liberty then the identity of the 
informant is disclosed and then they go into witness protection… But you would 
never in a criminal law context have an unidentified, unchallenged informant’s 
information used to affect a person’s liberty. But in the intelligence context, a 
person can be deported, which affects their liberty, perhaps deported to torture, 
which affects the security of their person, on the basis of unchallenged credentials 
of an informant. (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015) 
 Enabling special advocate access to witnesses and examination of the source, it is 
claimed, would have a profound “chilling effect” on the willingness of sources to come 
forward and would limit the ability of CSIS to recruit new information sources (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), paras. 
89, 138; Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). The high court also ruled that 
 
 68 
the disclosure of abridged summaries to the suspect and allowing special advocates access 
to un-redacted versions in closed session was “sufficient to prevent significant prejudice to 
[the suspect’s] ability to know and meet the case against him” (Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), para. 97). Criminal 
cases cannot place as much weight in hearsay as is done in SCI cases. Summaries, special 
advocates, and judicial discretion function as doubles or equivalents of disclosure, but do 
not offer a rigorous evidentiary standard thus contributing to a simulation of just court 
proceedings. 
Respondents noted that special advocates have two tasks: first they should push as 
much confidential information into the public realm as possible and then they should use 
whatever is left to closed hearings to challenge the allegations against the named person. 
“In an ideal case the special advocate would push all of the classified information out to 
the public counsel and then retire” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). 
Though special advocates have never been successful in pushing all information into the 
open, it has been partially accomplished in most cases.65 However, as noted above, much 
of this information is heavily processed (transposed and translated) and merely stands in 
for the originals (Baudrillard, 1994). The advantage of pushing information into the public 
realm is highlighted by Green (1997) who suggests that lay knowledge is often neglected. 
The disclosure of newspaper articles and online sources of questionable quality used 
within the (public) Security Intelligence Report (SIR) demonstrate the importance of 
                                                
65 In Mr. Harkat’s case additional summarized third party information was disclosed due to the urging of his 
special advocates (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 (CanLII), para. 33). 
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experts and the general public being able to discredit ‘evidence’66 in addition to the named 
person being informed enough to fully respond to allegations. If more people are privy to 
the detailed allegations duplicates and doubles may be less influential and allow named 
persons to advocate for themselves. 
All respondents noted the limitations placed upon special advocates in comparison 
with a criminal defence lawyer. In addition to deficiencies in support and communication, 
there is information about sources that is held back from special advocates “even beyond 
just the name or the identifying features” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 
2015). The trouble with this is that in an intelligence context a person can be deported, 
perhaps to torture, “on the basis of unchallenged credentials of an informant” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). This contributes to the zone of indistinction where 
‘due process’ is depreciated. While typically the special advocates have the same 
knowledge of the provenance of intelligence as CSIS, that does not mean that CSIS knows 
the origin of the information. There is a relative parity of information between the 
Ministers and the special advocates, but this is not an indication of the ‘vettedness’ of the 
information. Even for judges who were eventually privy to all information, it was not clear 
whether information was coming from reports of conversations from an informant or 
surveillance or from electronic intercepts; the originality is entirely lost. The veracity of 
the summaries in indeterminable, however Justice Noël indicated that this was deliberate 
and necessary to protect sources from being identified (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 
(CanLII), para. 108). However, all of this summarizing is problematic as it is possible that 
                                                
66 An immigration lawyer that was present at two CSIS meetings with Mr. Harkat retained his own 
handwritten notes of the interview “which may contradict part of the summary of the interview of the 
Intelligence officers” (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 (CanLII), para. 48). 
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the copy does not closely reflect the model, or that the summary is further removed into 
hyperreality (Baudrillard, 1994). 
When made privy to information the special advocates, though limited in their 
powers, have been able to rectify some disparities with the aid of judges. As part of Mr. 
Harkat’s case it came out that a human source was shown to be untruthful in a polygraph 
test and this was withheld from the Court and special advocates by the Ministers; Justice 
Noël regarded the withholding of this information as a breach of duty on behalf of the 
Minister’s counsel (Harkat (Re), [2010] 4 FCR 149, 2009 FC 1050 (CanLII)). However, 
rather than excluding the evidence, the remedy was to set aside human source privilege 
making the entire human source file available to the special advocates. For Mr. Almrei’s 
case, the special advocates discovered some issues with the human source information 
with polygraphs not being administered as reported and questionable circumstances 
surrounding polygraphs. Further, comparisons done between human source reports and 
other information held by CSIS such as intercept and surveillance reports “identified some 
serious contradictions,” with one source being discredited as a result of reporting 
conflicting dates and times (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 163). The 
admitting of such questionable evidence reinforces zones of indistinction where mimicry 
overtakes reliability.  
Without the work of the special advocates it is likely that these problems with the 
material would not come to light. In his public decision, Justice Mosely noted that CSIS’s 
inability to provide a satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies “suggests a serious 
lack of analytical capacity in managing enormous volume of information collected by the 
Service” (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 164). Part of the concern is that the 
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CSIS witnesses are often ‘representative’ witnesses who have no firsthand knowledge of 
the case and are unable to speak to details beyond those in the SIR, rather they merely 
recount copies of the work of others adding another level of duplication to the ‘evidence.’ 
Overall, the sources used in Mr. Almrei’s case were unreliable as one source that was 
interviewed in 2001 with information suggesting that Mr. Almrei was untruthful, 
recounted consistently with Mr. Almrei’s version of events when interviewed again in 
2004. However, CSIS used the 2001 account in the SIR updated in 2008 (Almrei (Re), 
2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 438). Not holding intelligence up to the rigour of evidence 
or CSIS to the standards of a policing agency are key differences between SCI and 
criminal justice mechanisms. The SCI as a simulation pushes for a form of justice for 
which special advocates stand in for ‘real’ defence lawyers without much needed abilities. 
The Necessity of [Over-]Judicializing Intelligence 
 
Of significance is that these cases are based largely on intelligence reports of 
questionable quality. One hurdle is that actionable information loses its value when 
exclusive knowledge becomes common knowledge (de Lint, O’Connor, and Cotter, 2007). 
With access to intelligence being ‘leveled’ and there being multiple informal points of 
control, de Lint et al. (2007: 51) note that there are “intelligence interruptions” as well as 
“asymmetrical flow problems.” This is reflected in some certificates being based on 
information gained through torture; if the intelligence has passed through too many, and 
possibly non-trusted, or illegitimate nodes, it loses its validity. The existence of a single 
database contributed to by multiple agencies allows for the dissemination of 
accountability for actions carried out based on the information available (Diab, 2008). 
However, supplicates, doubles, and copies are problematic corollaries. Use of intelligence 
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raises concerns with regards to the method through which it is gathered, with both torture 
and leveraging potentially compromising the credibility. Secret knowledge can be both a 
commodity and create power relationships, especially under situations of pre-emption 
(Bigo 2002). Cooperation with foreign agencies is the central concern with CSIS 
information being tainted by torture. 
In addition to other materials, SIRs are used by CSIS to support the certificate 
cases. Redacted SIRs are made publicly available for each SCI case. They are essentially a 
narrative report of assertions deduced from a variety of sources, both open and closed. 
Despite the use of open source information, such as online sources and newspaper articles, 
the material may still be redacted due to CSIS not wanting the public to know how the 
information is being interpreted and analysed; “The Service doesn’t differentiate between 
open and closed sources and seek to corroborate the facts” (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 
(CanLII), para. 190). The corroboration of facts is difficult when working with 
summaries; one respondent noted that two or three different parties may bring forward the 
same information, however it may be stemming from the same (potentially unreliable) 
source transmitting the information to third parties67 (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, 
December 2014; See also Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 
122 (CanLII), para. 137; Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1092 (CanLII), para. 643). Here the 
copying, duplicating, and doubling of information (Baudrillard, 1994) suggests the 
validity of information, when the case is the very opposite. Within Mr. Mahjoub’s case, it 
was a concern that information came from an unreliable source that was being ‘recycled’ 
                                                
67 For Justice Létourneau “Corroboration of an erroneous, deficient, misleading or inadequate summary 
merely compounds the prejudice resulting from the destruction of the original” (Harkat v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 142).  
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through one that was reliable (Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1092 (CanLII), para. 115).68 The 
struggle with sourcing information from the international intelligence community reflects 
the contradictions of what qualifies as evidence in both content and process. 
CSIS intelligence coming to be used as evidence is referred to as the 
“judicialization” of intelligence (Mactavish, 2013). This is one way of portraying the SCI 
process as a zone of indistinction; a form of information not meant to be in the courts is 
introduced and made to ‘pass’ as evidence. Retired CSIS director Jim Judd publicly 
criticized intelligence being brought into the courtroom (Freeze and Wingrove, 2009; 
Roach, 2011). The introduction of their material into court has been upsetting for CSIS 
who, according to respondents, “never expected to end up in court” (Interview with Yavar 
Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015) and does not “particularly enjoy finding itself in court” 
(Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015); “For CSIS I think it was probably a 
fairly traumatic transition to a new era” (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). 
One respondent characterized the disclosure required by CSIS as a teething process  
for the Service to accept that—not accept, but be schooled that this is an 
adversarial system. But I think that has matured now, to a degree, and I think 
we’ve lost our baby teeth and the grown-up teeth are coming in. (Interview with 
Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015)  
“Simply put, CSIS is not a policing agency and their information gathering practices are 
never meant to stand up to courtroom scrutiny” (email correspondence with CSIS 
representative, August 2015). It has only been over time that the process of using 
                                                
68 This paraphrase comes from a reason for decision that is heavily redacted, including sections of the 
paragraph being referenced. 
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intelligence in Court has been worked out, in some measure, under the SCI.69 However, 
this innovation is leading to the indistinguishability of the copy from the original 
(Baudrillard, 1994) and goes simply beyond pretending to have what one does not. 
Instead, intelligence is being reproduced and coming to stand in for evidence with 
troublesome consequences for justice as secrecy is being normalized in the courts. 
Using the Charkaoui II ruling, Roach (2009: 18) indicates that “the Court noted 
that security certificates made use of intelligence as evidence and that such evidential uses 
of intelligence would require CSIS to adjust their retention policies to observe evidentiary 
standards.” Stemming from the Charkaoui II ruling and Reasons for Decision is an explicit 
explanation of evidence and its significance (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2008] 2 SCR 326, 2008 SCC 38 (CanLII)). Noting the Canadian Security 
and Intelligence Act, it is emphasized that intelligence cannot be understood as simply 
summaries of raw datum that has been destroyed. Original operational notes should be 
retained because they are a better source of information and evidence when used to 
support a certificate. Additionally, original notes are needed to refresh the memories of 
agents who may be testifying to the content of a summary. Further, not having original 
notes compromises the ability of the judge and ministers to adequately perform their roles 
in the process. The continual struggle between intelligence and evidence suggests that 
there are endeavours to ensure that the SCI references the characteristics of the criminal 
justice system. Making use of original documentation, though an improvement on 
summaries, maintains a level of exceptionality in using secret information in courts while 
at the same time normalizing the process. 
                                                
69 The ‘working out’ of the SCI has been to the detriment of the lives of multiple (mainly Muslim) men who 
found themselves in a consistent state of uncertainty.  
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Concluding that CSIS investigations are central to the decisions to issue 
certificates and removal orders, it was decided that there is a duty for CSIS to retain 
operational notes and to not destroy them following the creation of a summary.70 71 
Unfortunately, there was little remedy available in cases where the original data had 
already been destroyed; judges were reluctant to quash certificates on this basis. The 
Charkaoui II decision notes that “As things stand, the destruction by CSIS of their 
operational notes compromises the very function of judicial review” (Charkaoui v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 2 SCR 326, 2008 SCC 38 (CanLII), para. 
62).72 Overall, the Courts assert that it is troubling to assume that information can stand in 
the place of evidence once it has been processed and/or transposed so extensively bringing 
attention to the problem of simulation (Baudrillard, 1994), but the Courts have been 
reluctant to remedy this by quashing certificates. 
At the basis of Mr. Mahjoub’s reasonableness determinations was the connection 
of information with Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CIDT) and/or torture. The 
public Reasons for Decision were not ‘rewritten’ as with some other cases, but published 
in redacted form, making some parts difficult to read and understand73 (Mahjoub (Re), 
2010 FC 787 (CanLII) and Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1092 (CanLII)). The association of 
this case with CIDT and torture generated interesting and crucial questions about the onus 
                                                
70 The destruction of operating notes was for the purpose of preserving civil liberties; CSIS is now being 
asked to keep records for the same reason (See Roach, 2011). The judgement concluded that operational 
notes should be kept for ‘targeted’ investigations, but not for ‘general’ investigations.  
71 As noted in Mr. Harkat’s case, the use of intelligence resulted in named persons being given the 
opportunity to respond to “a summary of the summaries” (Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 
2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 122). 
72 Destruction of electronic intercepts and original interview notes occurred within the Alrmrei case, but was 
“not an issue of major concern in this case” as it did not affect the outcome (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 
(CanLII), para. 491-492).  




of connecting information with CIDT and torture: Is the onus on the Ministers to 
demonstrate that it is not connected? Or on the special advocates to establish that it is 
connected? And what is the standard of proof? Additionally, there was the necessity of 
establishing why it is important to not introduce information that comes from CIDT and 
torture into the courtroom. The Reasons for Decision assert that the onus was on the 
Ministers to demonstrate that information was not connected to CIDT or torture as they 
were in a better position to establish the provenance of the information. The standard of 
proof established was that of “reasonable grounds to believe” (Mahjoub (Re), 2010 FC 
787 (CanLII), para. 21). Justice Blanchard reasoned that information connected to CIDT 
and torture should not be allowed in the courts because it is unreliable, should be 
discouraged, and contradicts the integrity of judicial proceedings (Mahjoub (Re), 2010 FC 
787 (CanLII), para. 66). Here information of specific provenance is not a proper referent 
for evidence and it seems there are limits to the zone of indistinction reflected in the extent 
to which intelligence can stand in for evidence. 
The introduction of the SAP contributed to the equity of the SCI process, but 
disclosure restrictions cause a derogation from the traditional adversarial process (See also 
Harkat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 57). 
Multiple respondents noted that the introduction of the special advocates was an 
improvement, but did not ‘fix’ the constitutionality of the system in their minds. The 
introduction of security-cleared lawyers does not fully rectify the mimicry of evidence 
occurring in the courtrooms due to transposition, translating, and extensive copying—
special advocates are unable to rectify the destruction of originals (Baudrillard, 1994). 
Pre-SAP, judges are characterized as a ‘fig leaf’ covering up a problematic process 
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(Hugessen, 2002), it seems the special advocates have taken on that role. There are two 
perspectives with regards to asserting political agency in an imperfect system: one 
respondent suggested that “it may be better to participate in the [constitutionally 
unfixable] system than to walk away” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 2015), while 
another decided not to be a “cog in the wheel” validating a flawed system (Interview with 
Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015).74 The zone of indistinction created by innovation of the 
legal system is divisive as exceptionality plays out to the detriment of a non-citizen 
subjects.  
One respondent notes how decades ago the practice in cases such as these was for 
the Court to not inquire too deeply into the reasons for a national security claim on behalf 
of the Ministers; this was known as “Crown Privilege” (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, 
December 2014). But this began to change around the time of the MacDonald 
Commission75 and the creation of CSIS. Respondents noted that such deference to CSIS or 
co-opting was taking place not just decades ago, but in the more recent SCI cases 
(Interview with Activist, Ottawa, May 2015; See also Macfarlane, 2012; Rankin, 1986). 
The sentiment is that the Courts became more confident and security proceedings became 
more open and this is why judges have been more stringent about what ‘counts’ as 
evidence. The slow relaxation of security measures may also have to do with the passage 
of time as some respondents note that following 9/11 there was a “climate of concern”: 
“There was a real sense at that time that a similar attack could occur anywhere in the 
Western World, including Canada” (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). One 
                                                
74 Mr. Galati walked out of court instead of having his robes used “to pervert the course of justice” in an 
early SCI proceeding (Interview, Toronto, June 2015). 
75 A Royal Commission of Inquiry into some of the activities of the RCMP initiated in 1982 that resulted in 
the creation of CSIS in 1984. 
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respondent felt that the special advocates have pushed the judiciary to be less afraid of the 
Service’s claims of national (in)security: 
So for years and years and years, before special advocates were involved it was 
just the Service [(CSIS)] and the judge, and it was a hot-house, just them. And 
the judges became, I think, somewhat co-opted; they were essentially the judicial 
authorization branch of the Service. And they just accepted what the Service had 
to say. And when we started as special advocates the attitude of the judges then 
compared to now was quite different. Now they’re not so willing to just accept 
what the Service has to say because there have been some spectacular instances 
where the Service’s information has been established to be wrong. (Interview 
with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015) 
Another respondent was troubled by some of the judges having a pre- special advocate 
stance that the Court could effectively take a quasi-inquisitorial role and serve as the truth-
seeker on behalf of the named person. However, the introduction of the SAP was likely 
something that the judges appreciated: “I think that that return to that [adversarial] system 
also gave them a great deal more comfort and confidence than the process of trying to 
figure this out all on [their] own” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). 
Despite respondents suggesting that judges tend to defer to CSIS, in a judgement it is 
explicitly stated that  
Although their expertise is taken into consideration in this delicate mandate, the 
judge owes no deference to the assertions made by CSIS or the Ministers in this 
regard; nor does it owe any deference to the special advocates. The decision is the 
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designated judge’s alone. This is what Parliament decreed. (Charkaoui (Re), 
2009 FC 1030 (CanLII), para. 76).   
Here, discomfort with the SCI process is an indication of it not being genuine to the 
principles of a ‘real’ judicial system as understood by legal actors. The judge’s authority 
should be assumed, rather than have to be stated, suggesting that the legitimacy of these 
hybrid legal proceedings is in question and up for debate (Trubek and Trubek, 2005) 
“Inequality of Arms” and Zones of Indistinction 
 
Multiple respondents spoke about the equality of arms, referring to the importance 
in the adversarial process that the two sides be armed up equally in order to have a fair 
fight (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, May 2015; Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, 
January 2015; Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). It is this dynamic of 
inequity that degrades due process and reflects a zone of indistinction where potentialities 
are abound. One respondent noted how the additional disclosure received in the second 
iteration of certificates was distressing to the open counsel because they realized what 
additional motions and strategies could have been used had they been in possession of that 
information earlier (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). However, the way in 
which previously closed information became public is important; during Mr. Charkaoui’s 
case confidential information held by CSIS was leaked to two journalists and the 
information was confirmed by an additional government source according to the published 
news article and testimony from the journalists (Charkaoui (Re), [2009] 1 FCR 507, 2008 
FC 61 (CanLII)). While multiple named persons did want all information to become 
public so that they could fully know and meet the case against them76 the way in which 
                                                
76 See Wala (2014) 
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select top-secret information77 against Mr. Charkaoui became public “had a deleterious 
impact on the entire judicial system and the administration of justice, and may have 
affected Mr. Charkaoui’s fundamental rights” (Charkaoui (Re), [2009] 1 FCR 507, 2008 
FC 61 (CanLII), p. 2). This instance demonstrates the importance of context in how secret 
information becomes available, which impacts how it is used. Discrepancies in what is 
known by whom creates a space of inequity where the boundary between actuality and 
potentiality is unclear. 
Ministers’ counsel is able to communicate about decisions across cases as they are 
all part of the same team. However, opportunities to strategize were inequitable as open 
counsel received only redacted decisions and special advocates had to apply to get the 
decisions of other cases and were unable to discuss them with named persons or open 
counsel. While two special advocates allowed for some discussion of ideas, Ministers’ 
counsel was made up of larger teams who knew the details of the case(s). For the 
Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada, what is especially important about 
maintaining a high standard of openness is that it “gives us the best guarantee that 
evidence is being probed and tested and examined” (Interview with Alex Neve, Ottawa, 
February 2015). It is only through careful scrutiny that the origins of information will 
surface; “we know that secrecy always is the torturer’s greatest friend” (Interview with 
Alex Neve, Ottawa, February 2015). One respondent noted how it is only when both sides 
are ‘equally armed’ that the truth will come out; for this respondent, the ability to cross-
examine witnesses is a defence lawyer’s main tool (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 
2015). Under the SCI, this tool is not always available to the special advocate who is 
                                                




doubly crippled by not being able to communicate with others and not always having 
access to CSIS witnesses and this compromises the possibility of fair proceedings. 
Further, respondents noted the inequality of arms that results from the lack of 
clerical staff for special advocates (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015; 
Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). Though this should be addressed in future 
cases due to new precedent, one respondent noted how their top-secret cleared junior was 
not allowed to assist in the case (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). Another 
respondent commented that “if it weren’t so sad it’d be funny to see this sixty-year-old 
lawyer standing at a photocopy machine for three days assembling documents” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). A main concern with the lack of support staff is 
that it could lead to shortcuts, in addition to the issue of it being a poor use of financial 
resources (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). The use of special advocates 
is an effort towards equitable justice proceedings, but there are still significant criticisms, 
and limitations that debase the SCI and make the proceeding indistinct with regards to 
fairness. The communication ban that previously existed between special advocates and 
the named person led to the tactic of special advocates obtaining an exhaustive biography 
prior to viewing the confidential information. As one respondent notes, this “requires a 
great deal of trust on the part of somebody who has come from a country where you don’t 
trust people, even though you’re told that they are meant to be representing your 
interest”78 (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). Special advocates, though not 
acting for the Ministers, are trained and paid by the government; the relationship between 
                                                
78 It is for this reason that named persons lying and withholding information within their immigration status 
proceedings was not always held against them; it is quite common and Justice Mosely suggest that the 
Service may have given this type of untruthfulness too much weight (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), 
para. 201; See also Razack, 1998). 
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named persons and their special advocate is “fraught” at best (Interview with Lawyer, 
Ottawa, February 2015). The abilities and rapport are not genuine in the sense of counsel 
privilege in a typical juridical process. 
Though the inequality of arms issue seems a very practical one that can be simply 
addressed through better resource allocation, the ramification is that establishing facts 
within these cases is unnecessarily challenging. The political structure of homo sacer is 
evident where different rules apply within the SCI cases—aside from the SCI process only 
applying to non-citizens. The zone of indistinction between actuality and potentiality is 
reinforced by unworkable circumstances where advocates are disadvantaged by 
knowledge and resource discrepancies. Compounded by the indistinguishability of copies 
from the original (Baudrillard, 1994) within the information that is made available to the 
special advocates, the SCI is no longer representative of a justice system as it has been 
severely transformed and distorted. Such perversion is carried out in the name of national 
security and the protection of Canada, but what is being lost in the process of securing 
needs accounting for. 
Conclusion: What is injurious to national security? And why are such decisions 
reached through a “Sham” and “Monumental Failure” that consists of “Leaps of the 
Imagination”? 
A significant reason for the intelligence remaining secret in these cases is the 
potential for impairment of intelligence gathering functions. If sources of intelligence dry 
up or become unreliable Canadian security will be compromised. Other countries will no 
longer want to cooperate or share with Canada if the government starts disclosing 
information that embarrasses states or compromises their ability to gather more 
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intelligence through divulging ongoing investigations or intelligence gathering techniques 
and capabilities (Interview with Layer, Ottawa, February 2015). There are concerns with 
the “chilling effect” of not granting class privilege to CSIS human sources, which would 
result in the inability to recruit new sources (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. 
Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), para. 89; Interview with Lawyer, 
Ottawa, February 2015). These concerns are especially significant for Canada as a net 
importer of intelligence upon which it needs to be able to depend (Harkat v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122 (CanLII), para. 108; Lutfy, 2011; Roach, 
2009, 2011). 
Under IRPA, the designated judge decides what can and cannot be disclosed 
publicly based on the criteria of its release being injurious to national security or 
endangering the safety of any person (Valverde, 2015). In the case of Mr. Charkaoui, the 
presiding judge decided that some of the secret information that the certificate was based 
on could be released, but rather than disclose this information, the Ministers withdrew the 
certificate allowing Mr. Charkaoui full release with no conditions; “[the government] 
would rather have him at liberty in Canada than disclose the information that the judge 
wanted disclosed” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). This is a hazard of 
the Canadian government relying on secret information to restrict an individual’s liberty. 
The fact that a designated judge believed the information could be publicly disclosed 
reflects what multiple respondents and authors refer to as ‘overclaiming’ on behalf of the 
Ministers.79 80 
                                                
79 The Ministers have redacted documents provided to special advocates resulting in the Court ordering the 
Ministers to gain permission from the foreign agency to disclose the information. The Ministers argued that 
merely asking permission to share information would compromise the flow of information (Charkaoui (Re), 
[2010] 3 FCR 102, 2009 FC 476 (CanLII)). The Court found this argument unconvincing.   
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An ongoing theme within interviews and intelligence literature is the tendency of 
the Ministers and cooperating government agencies to ‘overclaim’ the necessity of 
information remaining secret (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, October 2014; Interview 
with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). In his decision to quash Mr. Almrei’s certificate, 
Justice Mosely notes that he was satisfied with what was redacted for the most part, but 
“In some instances…I considered that the redactions had been excessive and tended to 
unnecessarily obscure portions of the records” (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII), 
para. 33). In this case, the Ministers removed such redactions when ordered to reconsider. 
In Mr. Harkat’s reasonableness decision the judges came down even harder on the 
(over)use of secrecy:  
The content of the closed hearings overlapped significantly with the open hearing 
and did not assist [the Supreme Court] in deciding the issues before it. It served 
only to foster an appearance of opacity of these proceedings, which runs contrary 
to the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability. (Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 
(CanLII), para. 26)  
Over time some judges became dissatisfied with the Ministers’ zealousness in relying on 
secret information. Such extraneous claims to secrecy have hindered and extended the 
work of public inquiries and trials (Roach, 2011). Specifically, within the SCI, claims of 
secrecy undermine justice as what is known is limited and copied intelligence that is put 
forward to pass as evidence is severely lacking in rigour.  
                                                                                                                                             
80 One respondent estimates that of what the Ministers claim is national security they have probably over 
claimed by half (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). 
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The hybridity of the SCI (Trubek and Trubek, 2005) contributes to the generation 
of a zone of indistinction; it combines rights protections and rights violations in a way that 
makes the named person a supplicant hoping for a just handout. The SCI is polarizing as 
individuals have strong feelings about it, but are hesitant to speak generally about it; 
special advocates are a welcome addition to the system, but some believe the entire 
system should be abolished. Multiple respondents held back on providing an assessment 
or evaluation of the SCI, while others were very clear in their criticisms. One participant’s 
words fully capture their thoughts on the effectiveness of the SCI:  
[The SCI] has to be seen as a monumental failure from all of the departments and 
at every level because—I’m not talking about win-loss calculus here, they did 
have losses that any government should accept as the outcome of justice, just like 
when a crown attorney loses a case, that shouldn’t be seen as some failure on his 
or her part or on the system’s part, it’s simply the way the process works—so I 
don’t mean failure on that account… But I mean failure in terms of the sheer 
volume of resources they devoted and the time it took, and the expense, and the 
cumbersomeness… It just is not an efficient process. Now on the other hand, it is 
the most thorough process they have for an extremely draconian result. 
(Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015) 
Another respondent noted that the SCI process is not beneficial for the named person or 
the government: “I don’t think that it’s [a process] that particularly serves the needs of 
anyone” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). Other respondents were more 
tempered in their opinion suggesting that it is not an ideal system, but ‘it is what it is.’ 
These statements point to the SCI not meeting some parameter set out in the minds of 
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those working within the system and suggest that actual justice is not the outcome. Rather, 
justice is merely being simulated by the process that involves over processed information 
and inequitable support between sides. According to Roach (2011: 405), “Security 
certificates in Canada have failed as antiterrorism policy.” Most often the referent for 
comparison is the criminal justice system indicating a loss of what is felt to provide ‘real’ 
justice (Baudrillard, 1994). As noted above, much of the concern with the SCI stems from 
the ambiguity in evidentiary standards due to the use of intelligence and the way in which 
the court cases mimic just proceedings, but fail to actualize fair outcomes. 
While it is easy to simply write off the SCI as an exceptional, this chapter 
demonstrates the intricacies and references that reflect homo sacer subjectivity (Agamben, 
1998). Under the SCI non-citizens are not entitled to the rights afforded to Canadian 
citizens and the ‘prosecution’ of simulated terrorism offences is complimented by 
simulated security effects. The zone of indistinction between actuality and potentiality is 
exacerbated by the use of unreliable information. Of grave concern with such a debauched 
simulation of evidence is that ‘real’ offences may be obscured; the controversies over 
secret evidence needs to be taken seriously because it “can turn terrorist suspects into 
fairness martyrs” and obscure the reality of the terrorist threat from the public (Roach, 
2012: 179). One respondent who was strongly opposed to the SCI stressed that “I don’t 
take national security issues lightly. I understand that the threat of terrorism is very real” 
(Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015). It is necessary that terrorism be secured 
against, but such rights-compromising simulations of justice require reimagining.  
The contents of the public summaries of allegations against non-citizen subjects 
“isn’t nothing” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). At face value the 
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intelligence indicates that the CBSA took the correct steps in apprehending these 
individuals. If the information could be proven inaccurate it would be easy to drop the 
certificates (though the ordeal of these non-citizen subjects can never by recompensed). 
The complication is that the level of simulation goes beyond Baudrillard's (1994) idea of 
pretending to have what one does not. The Ministers are not fabricating information, 
rather intelligence goes through so much processing, doubling, and copying that what 
stands in for evidence under the SCI is indistinguishable from initial iterations. As noted 
above, practices of informer privilege, transposition, translation, and summarizing obscure 
what is in the (destroyed) originals. Information has been so transformed that the copies 
displace the original. And perhaps, most problematically, these practices support a 
political structure in which non-citizens and citizens have different rights with the looming 
potential for all to lose such rights should the exception become the norm. Such steadfast 
longing for the (albeit limited and problematic) protections provided by the criminal 





Chapter III: Scaling Unease: Mobilizing national security as a legal chronotope 
Introduction 
 
Pre-9/11, certificates were largely outside of public knowledge and not the focus 
of any popular rights movement. They were predominantly topical in the offices of 
specialized immigration lawyers fighting them until Mr. Jaballah’s second certificate. It 
was around this time, October 2001, that the news media started regularly covering the 
cases. Certificates began under the 1976 Immigration Act81 as a way to deem non-citizen 
persons inadmissible to Canada on various safety and security grounds (Immigration Act, 
1978); as will be discussed, the earlier iteration of the measure dealt efficiently and 
effectively with espionage concerns, but were complicated by challenges when grounds 
were rooted in ‘political extremism,’ and even further obscured by post-9/11 terrorism 
accusations. It has only been within the past sixteen years that certificates have 
transformed into the procedure that currently exists in the courts. Currently, certificates 
are issued by the Government of Canada on advice from Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) officials, and signed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness and the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (IRCC).82 
Enabled under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (2001), certificates, 
now often referred to as “security” certificates, act as de facto detention and deportation 
orders for the person named in them. Since 1978, the process involved in issuing and 
executing a certificate has undergone broad changes. Now a full government program 
referred to as the “Security Certificate Initiative” (SCI),83 certificates do not consistently 
act as expedited deportation orders, but have initiated extensive court proceedings and 
                                                
81 S. 39. (1). 
82 Previously Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 
83 See Public Safety Canada (2010). 
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legal challenges regarding both Canadian and international law. In practice, certificates 
represent a story of the failure to efficiently transform a state of insecurity into a state of 
security through the creation and consolidation of legal networks infrastructure, and 
security forces. This chapter identifies the SCI as a legal chronotope and works to isolate 
and clarify some of the important dimensions and objects that contribute to the SCI, as 
well as examine actors and their roles that unfold under the SCI narrative. 
Approaching the SCI as a legalistic mechanism, this chapter conducts what 
Valverde (2015: 57) refers to as a ‘scalar analysis’ that considers space, time, as well as 
affect and mood. This form of analysis should not be confused with a theory of security, 
but rather is a methodological review of how spacetime is an essential component of 
security and the jurisdictional ‘games’ afoot when confronting the terror threat of ‘non-
citizens.’ Following Bakhtin, Valverde's (2015) analysis of ‘chronotopes’ enables a review 
of the temporal and spatial dimensions of governance projects and how they affect one 
another.84 The chronotope thus adds depth and extension through the consideration of how 
ends are reached though scalar choices and shows the “social production” of law 
(Valverde, 2015: 154) by examining governance projects. Supplemental to the 
examination of narrative accounts (objectives and goals), techniques and strategies, or 
constitutive subjectivities, chronotopic analysis brings to light the spatial, jurisdictional, 
and temporal processes of governance projects. As such, it reveals the mobility of 
governance rather than its fixtures. Insight into the temporal protraction of the SCI cases is 
gained through an examination of nuances in workspaces in which national security is 
manifest in the conditions of actors working alone. This analysis is not meant to prove the 
                                                
84 Rather than simply analyzing space and time separately and then adding them together. 
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existence of the SCI as a ‘chronotope,’ but is a way of examining the more obscured 
components that expose the gaps of the SCI as a governance process.  
Much of the literature available about the SCI stems from the discipline of law, 
with a portion of sociological literature engaging with important narratives of 
exceptionalism,85 and other socio-legal authors incorporating ideas of the ‘othering’ 
involved in Canadian immigration policy.86 Overall, the literature acknowledges various 
justice and rights concerns, with Larsen, Harkat, and Harkat (2008) being an especially 
significant piece that incorporates the voices and asserts the political agency of named 
person Mohamed Harkat and his spouse Sophie Harkat by extensively quoting their 
responses to questions about their experience. While some of the literature about the SCI 
engages with ideas of spacetime and jurisdiction, few do so in a way that unpacks 
spacetime and jurisdictional formations as the appearance of the SCI as a ‘chronotope of 
security’ (Valverde, 2015). One direct examination of the issue of temporality is Larsen's 
(2014) chapter on the ‘permanent temporariness’ of the SCI that considers attempts to 
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens and to reinforce the normalization of the 
exception. Larsen (2014: 86) uses the term ‘indefinitely pending’ to indicate the 
experience “of being permanently caught in a web of transitory processes and conditions 
that are ostensibly in furtherance of a future state of total expulsion.” The experience of 
being indefinitely pending is illustrated using the spatial settings of indefinite detention 
(institutional space) and conditional release (domestic space) (Larsen, 2014). Larsen and 
Piché  (2007, 2009) provide detailed studies of the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre 
                                                
85 See example: Aitken, 2008; Bell, 2006, 2011b; French, 2007; Larsen, 2008; Larsen and Piché , 2007, 
2009; Oriola, 2009. 




(KIHC) as a jurisdictional struggle embedded within a carceral space. The aim of this 
piece is to build upon the analysis of Larsen (2014) and Larsen and Piché  (2007, 2009) by 
considering additional chronotopic SCI mechanisms. 
Valverde (2015) suggests that legal discourse shares commonalities with literary 
genres87 such that the multiplicity of perspectives88 and the influence of spacetimes are 
relevant to both. Rather than considering space and time separately or simply adding the 
analysis of one to the other, Valverde (2015) suggests that it is important to pay attention 
to their interaction,89 and the way spatial and temporal indicators are fused into wholes to 
form a world within which the narrative develops and in which authors and characters act 
and react to one another; this is the premise of a chronotope. For example, in the 
monological encounter of authorial and character positions, authors know more and see 
more than characters (O’Connor, 2002: 163). They know what is going on in, and are 
privy to, a world, which operates behind the characters’ backs. Such authorial positions 
occupy privileged positionality in space and time as a result of surplus knowledge, 
enabling them to anticipate what will happen next and how the story will unfold (Bakhtin, 
1981). As in the novel, force relations both form and shape access to spatiotemporal 
worlds of action and interaction. Following these ideas, this chapter engages with the 
spacetimes, mood, and jurisdiction of the SCI to illustrate the how the encounter of legal 
and security forces shapes the SCI world and the relations of its characters and authors.  
                                                
87 Genre is not the equivalent of chronotope; a chronotope may unite or transcend genres or underscore a 
narrative. Valverde (2015) approaches law as a genre. 
88 Also referred to as “heteroglossia.”  
89 Here Valverde (2015) views Bakhtin to be more useful than Deleuze. Deleuzian chronotopes are a 
montage of hierarchical relations, where, for example, images of time are either subordinated to movement 
through space or extension through various sensory-motor formulae (the movement-image) or exerts its 
independence as co-possible futures (time-image).  
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Due to the lengthy existence of certificates, it is important to contextualize this 
discussion within the socio-political milieu in which the SCI have taken shape. This is not 
to provide divisive points, but rather map out a genealogy of the SCI as a spatiotemporal 
governance project. The phases outlined here are not self-contained; social and political 
factors led to some changes in functioning of the SCI, though they remain overlapped with 
past practices: “In general, governing capacities and resources can always be flexibly re-
assembled or shifted to another scale in such a way as to create assemblages of recycled 
governing techniques that serve novel purposes” (Valverde, 2015: 52). Various authors 
and respondents note the transformation90 of the threat and the way authors, characters, 
and the law-security enterprise respond to that threat. 
Rather than examining the SCI as a space where law is applied, the idea of the 
chronotope is used to understand the SCI as constituting a world in which legal and 
national security force-relations unfold in space and time. This approach does not 
necessarily provide a historical teleology, but examines how spatiotemporal aspects of 
governance are assembled. Following O’Connor (2002), the idea of mobility is used to 
augment understanding of social processes involved in the SCI, where the SCI is a process 
of moving between one ‘place’ or state of affairs and another, ideally, from a state of 
suspected insecurity to a state of security (through banishment of the threat). The SCI is a 
tale of the cobbling together of forces, supports, and legal and security technologies to 
mitigate perceived threats. Five ‘non-citizen’ suspects are indicative of the threat and a 
patchwork of immigration, criminal, and civil legislation, in combination with an 
assembled cast of characters—security designated judges, special advocates, public 
                                                
90 There is an inclination to speak of the ‘evolution’ of the threat, but such connotations of progress or 
advancement are avoided here. 
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lawyers, named persons, and sureties—brought together in a series of legal and security 
force-relations. The scope of the assemblage involves not only the movement of ideas and 
practices across the boundaries of sites and institutions (Walters, 2017), but also across 
jurisdictions and governmental scales. Formed through the intersection of law and national 
security, the characters who serve as special advocates for the terror suspects have full 
knowledge of the intelligence against named persons, but are, by their own account, ill-
equipped underdogs while the cast of security-designated-judges face challenges of their 
own. Open counsel experience a knowledge deficit due to limited access to the world of 
security intelligence (playing the role of ‘evidence’), lack equalizing forces of legality, 
and, consequently, find themselves outside of their everyday ambit and experience as legal 
practitioners. Contingent detention practices, novel workplaces, and modified courts are 
the places where law and national security interact in a chronotope where the response to 
the terror threat of non-citizens fails, though threat is also seen to, or is made to, dissipate 
over time.  
This chapter first offers a consideration of 9/11 spacetimes as a spatial and 
temporal scale of the SCI and sets up the ideas of jurisdiction and mood to provide a 
framework for what is addressed in the following sections. Second, a historical context of 
how the SCI was initially conceptualized and how it has developed through multiple 
iterations involving temporality and spatialization in conjunction with jurisdictional 
moves is offered. The chapter then suggests that unease is a pervasive ambiance of the 
SCI and that this impacts its governing approach and effect. Bunkers as spaces in which 
the SCI is ‘worked out’ are then discussed, and in doing so, the chapter highlights the 
added challenges involved for actors due to the necessity of managing surplus knowledge; 
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having information to which not all actors are privy constrains every role. Before 
concluding, the diminishment of threat and how temporality has lowered the perceived 
risk, while presence in public spaces has had mixed effects on the threat evaluations, are 
considered. Thus, the main contribution of this chapter is the provision of a socio-legal 
analysis of the SCI using a fresh framework, the chronotope (Valverde, 2015), to expose 
some of its inner workings as a governing mechanisms. 
Post-9/11 SCI Space[Times] 
 
This section builds upon Valverde's (2015) approach by considering the spatial and 
temporal scale of the SCI in its current iteration, as well as the problem of jurisdiction and 
mood. Spatial scale involves quantitative space in the sense of size or dimensions as found 
in a map, but also qualitative space that considers social space and how one might account 
for their experience of displacement (Valverde, 2015: 59). For Deleuze, spacetime 
chronotopes are often ordered by a hierarchy of relations, where time is subordinated to 
movement through space. That is, time is expressed as the action of crossing or changing 
places in space and in going from one point or state of affairs to another. In this way, time 
is made linear and quantitative as a number that indirectly measures movement (Deleuze, 
1989: 36). Quantitative time is a function of normal movement. It appears between 
movements that go from point to point. In this subordination chronotope, actions are 
understood as reactions, provoked by a situation whose sensuous qualities are sufficiently 
given and serve as stimuli to action.  
For example, terror threats are now typically given within national security 
situations. Both sensuous quality and provocateur of action, the affective element of a 
security threat is a problem with vague potential. Without mechanism or direction, it 
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requires a body with the necessary qualities to direct and actualize it. Jurisdiction is the 
mechanism for determining which body has authority to respond to the problem and to 
determine the course of action, often based on their positionality and access to surplus 
knowledge.91 Jurisdiction is a ‘sorting practice,’ determining who governs and 
consequently how something will be governed. Jurisdiction is connected to spatial 
changes and is dependent upon mood (Valverde, 2015: 84, 86). Like the threat of 
espionage and political extremism, the contemporary problem of the potential threat of 
non-citizen terrorists is seen to fall normally within the SCI and comes under its 
jurisdiction. The certificate embodies the nature of the threat and initiates a response 
aimed at the expeditious deportation and banishment of the terror suspect.  
This analysis of the SCI covers five recent cases, those of: Messrs. Adil Charkaoui, 
Hassan Almrei, Mahmoud Jaballah, Mohamed Harkat, and Mohammad Mahjoub. The 
milieu within which the SCI operates has undergone significant transformations in terms 
of the security concern, as discussed in the following section. Enacting this concern within 
the ready-made immigration-security rubric creates a series of challenges where legality 
and national security encounter one another as a relation of forces and within which are 
created new legal-security characters and social spaces of detention, inquiry, and 
interaction (namely, KIHC, security intelligence bunkers, and secret courts), all of which 
are impacted by the affect of national security and are connected with prolonged work as a 
result of managing intelligence. As we will see, the context of the more recent SCI cases 
reflects both subtle and obvious transformations in the spatialization and temporality of 
the SCI as impacted by governing decision-making with regards to jurisdiction and 
                                                
91 Valverde (2015:  165) provides examples of chronotopes of security at the scale of local, family, and body 
and states that “it is difficult to generalize about the scope of national state jurisdiction.” 
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political affect. Such transformations impact the actors involved and the power and 
authority they wield. 
SCI Context: “Historical” time and temporality 
 
Three respondents indicated that the Cold War92 constituted the milieu in which to 
understand the initial development of the SCI, when espionage was a pervasive security 
concern (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015; Interview with Judge, Ottawa, 
December 2014; Interview with Community Organizer, Ontario, April 2015). The security 
challenge to be overcome by certificate legislation included Soviet spies, organized crime, 
and terrorism. During Senate and House of Commons deliberations of the 1976 
Immigration Bill (C-24) concerns over potential for abuses, arbitrary power, secrecy, and 
violation of civil liberties by certificate legislation were voiced (Senate of Canada, 1977). 
The initial formulation of the bill excluded Federal Court judges from being entrusted 
with security evidence based on the argument that the Federal Court is to handle law, not 
facts, because “It is not within its expertise to weigh matters of security”93 (House of 
Commons, 1987: 8593). Here, law is explicitly disconnected from security and there 
exists a spatial focus in the legislative assemblies rather than the courts.94 Further, this 
speaks strongly to jurisdiction as who governs is part of the calculus of who is the 
decision-maker, which also dictates how the issue will be governed (Valverde, 2015). 
Eventually, the legislation was passed under Sections 39 to 42 of the Immigration Act, 
(1976) under the heading “Safety and Security of Canada” (Immigration Act, 1978: 1219-
1222). In this first iteration, the SCI oversight was established via a Special Advisory 
                                                
92 The Cold War spanned from approximately 1947 to 1990. 
93 The judicialization of intelligence is on ongoing concern for CSIS (Freeze and Wingrove, 2009) 
94 For insight into the institutional role of the Supreme Courts see Macfarlane (2013). 
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Board that reported to the Minister and Solicitor General. The concern with espionage and 
effectiveness of certificates was validated by their efficient use against foreign spies. 
Three suspected Russian spies (two in 1996, one in 2006) were discovered and 
subject to certificates that resulted in their immediate deportation. These cases confirmed 
that certificates were effective counter-espionage tools since they quickly ended in 
deportation. But, one respondent could not understand why these individuals were “treated 
so nicely” (Interview with Lawyer (b), Toronto, October 2014). Rather than prosecuting 
spies for espionage, the Canadian Government exercised their jurisdictional authority by 
simply sending them home. When deployed for this type of case, the SCI worked as 
expected with suspects or ‘named persons’ consenting to be deported rather than 
languishing in detention; it was expedient for the government (Interview with Craig 
Forcese, Ottawa, October 2014; Interview with Judge, December 2014). However, 
espionage has not been the predominant target of the SCI. Prior to 9/11, the two 
communities most affected by security measures in Canada were Palestinians and Sri 
Lankan Tamils (Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015). Actual certificate issuance 
reflects a diverse cast of characters and a multiplicity of rationales. Certificates were 
issued against an Algerian for involvement in an “armed Islamic group,” a Sikh from 
India for connections to the Air India bombing, a Saudi for involvement in bombing USA 
barracks in Saudi Arabia before coming to Canada, a Kurd for connections to the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party,95 three Palestinians (at least one with admitted connections to 
the Palestine Liberation Organization), and three Iranians.96 Most of these individuals 
                                                
95 Suleyman Goven is a Kurdish man who faced accusations from CSIS without the issuance of a certificate. 
See Leddy (2010) for a detailed narrative of his ordeal. 
96 This information was compiled from Lamey (2011), websites such as Justice for Mohamed Harkat, Justice 
for Mahmoud Jaballah, Support Mohammad Mahjoub, and additional news and government websites. 
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came to Canada as refugee claimants and most were subsequently deported by means of a 
certificate; the government effectively ‘exports’ threats in these cases by relocating them 
outside of Canada rather than neutralizing the threat subject.97 
For the most part, pre-9/11 certificates resulted in expedient deportations. 
However, some earlier certificates were challenged by dedicated lawyers, including those 
against Manickavasagam Suresh whose (1993) certificate was annulled in 2007 and not 
re-issued,98 but a deportation order was recently (January 2017) upheld by the Federal 
Court (Bell, 2017). Also, Issam Al Yamani faced multiple certificates and deportation 
orders after his 1993 arrest, but has yet to be deported. In earlier years, certificates faced 
challenges, mostly in the space of lower courts, that were not particularly transformative. 
Some ‘successful’ certificates resulted in expedited deportation because the suspects were 
not concerned for their safety upon return.99 For those caught spying, “they willingly 
returned to their country of citizenship or last residence because there is no stake to 
staying in Canada with regards to their safety” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 
2015). For those accused of terrorism, return to a prior country of residence or citizenship 
is more likely to result in maltreatment. While deportation to spaces of maltreatment is 
only a secondary concern when determining the reasonableness of the certificate,100 it 
adds additional challenges to the expedient deportation of the accused persons (Interview 
with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014; Interview with Lawyer, January 2015; Interview 
                                                
97 Lamey (2011: 344-345) provides a chart of “Refugee Claims in Canada by Political Extremists 1985-
2005” that is helpful for understanding some certificate rationales, though Lamey (2011) does not appear to 
distinguish between “terrorist” and “accused terrorist.”  
98 Mr. Suresh is a Sri Lankan man accused of fundraising for the Tamil Tigers. For a comparative account of 
his case see Macklin (2002). 
99 This is not the case for the majority of SCI-based deportations.  
100 The experiences of Canadian citizens Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed El Maati, and Muayyed 
Nureddin further highlight concerns over the rendition of terror suspects  (Interview with Journalist, Ottawa, 
January 2015; see also MacCharles, 2017). 
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with Alex Neve, Ottawa, February 2015; Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015; 
Interview with Community Organizer, Ontario, April 2015; Interview with Supporter, 
Toronto, July 2015; Interview with Activist, Ottawa, July 2015). 
A perplexing component of the Cold War narrative is the involvement of named 
persons in the fight against the Soviet Union. Three respondents noted that Mr. Almrei 
was involved in battling the Soviets when the ‘West’ supported the war101 (Interview with 
Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015; Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014; 
Interview with Journalist, Ottawa, January 2015), while another noted the “Red-Scare” 
that took place in Canada when fear of communism and communist supporters was at its 
height during the USA’s ‘McCarthy era’ (Interview with Community Organizer, Ontario, 
April 2015). When the Soviet threat disappeared and hostility was directed towards the 
‘West,’ individuals who were only part of the first phase of Al Qaeda had ‘Western 
supported’ acts held against them (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). One 
respondent stated that SCI “characters are complicated: …we’re talking about whether or 
not a…Chechen fighter is a terrorist or a freedom fighter” (Interview with Journalist, 
Ottawa, January 2015). Political involvement that was once admirable is transformed into 
a potential threat, post-9/11. This reflects how temporality affects what is and is not a 
threat, where the threat originates, and how that threat is managed. One respondent noted 
that for named persons, it is likely that, after taking part in some (potentially clandestine) 
acts, they have come to Canada to put their past lives behind them (Interview with 
Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). Regardless of past actions, the certificate must establish a 
current or “present” threat to Canadian security to be reasonable. However, the worst-
                                                
101 For a discussion of Cold War politics and Islam see Mamdani (2004). 
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case-scenario approach sees SCI cases playing-up the “most dire and sinister 
circumstances” (Interview with Yavar Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015).  
The Honourable Anne Mactavish differentiates between the nature of the threat to 
Canada posed by international terrorist networks and past Cold War concerns of 
espionage, suggesting that the terrorist acts that took place on 9/11 were a marker of a 
shift in thinking around security (Mactavish, 2013). Many respondents acknowledged 9/11 
as crucial to the transformation of the SCI, having had a significant impact on security 
responses in general (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014; Interview with 
Journalist, Ottawa, January 2015; Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015; 
Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015; Interview with Community Organizer, 
Ontario, April 2015; Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 2015; Interview with Yavar 
Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015). However, proportionately, an examination of pre-9/11 
certificates does not reveal espionage as a more significant security threat than extremist 
associations. While 9/11 is widely held to be an influential factor in the use of certificates, 
some authors suggest that it merely hastened or rationalized already problematic legal 
practices that are not imperative for keeping Canada secure (See for example Aiken, 
2001c; Roach, 2002; Whitaker, 2002). One responded explicitly stated that they did not 
view the SCI as a post-9/11 undertaking: “It’s kind of a continuation of 
Canada’s…sketchy practices when it comes to migration” (Interview with Supporter, 
Toronto, July 2015). However, another respondent noted: “I didn’t feel these issues were 
taken up when I first started working on them, which was pre-9/11” (Interview with 
Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015). The events of 9/11 did not take place on Canadian soil, 
but significantly impacted the political environment in Canada. As an element of the SCI 
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chronotope, the ambiance of the situation (pre- or post- 9/11) produces a national-security-
scale response by means of an immigration mechanism effective for the expulsion (or 
perhaps exchange) of espionage threats from Canada rather than their criminal prosecution 
in Canada. When the primary character of the threat shifts from concerns over espionage 
and political extremism to heightened post-9/11 concerns over terrorism this political 
mechanism is repurposed for the new environment. And, as we will see, with these 
changes, jurisdictional reorganization makes an impactful change to how certificates 
operate. At the same time, deportation goals are increasingly problematized by rendition 
contingencies operating beyond the national scale as international regulations are 
recognized. Rather than temporal progress, there is a decided shift in characteristics of the 
world within which law and security function. This, in turn, affects the qualities and 
capacities of the immigration response targeting non-citizen threats. 
Mood/Affect: The state of unease 
 
In addition to space, time (scale), and jurisdiction, legal networks have mood or 
affect as an aesthetic dimension (Valverde, 2015). This dimension influences how 
governing projects are approached and differentiates by impacting how they are 
perceived; a mood may be positive or discouraging, though it is often not acknowledged 
by those governing it does impact measures and responses. Moods may be prominent or 
unobtrusive depending on the issue at hand (Valverde, 2015), while for Deleuze, 
situations are events that constitute a challenge and are rife with affect and ambiance 
(O’Connor, 2002). The feelings of unease stem from both sides of the SCI with different 
actors having their own reasons and perceptions of unease (Bigo, 2002). In the case of the 
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SCI, the mood is both glaring and complex in that there are very strong feelings about the 
need for national security as well as the necessity of acknowledging and honouring rights.  
Affect pervades the entirety of the SCI in a way that cannot be parsed into distinct 
components. As one respondent noted, post-9/11 the climate within government 
departments was very much one of concern: “There was a real sense at that time that a 
similar attack could occur anywhere in the Western World, including Canada” (Interview 
with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). Respondents noted that post-9/11 there is a 
(justifiable) hypervigilance to prevent another terrorist event, resulting in a hardline being 
taken through security legislation102 (Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015; 
Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). Post-9/11, just as with the Cold War, 
there is a pervasive ambiance of insecurity. The threat of another attack incites anxiety 
and fear and affectively charges ‘surroundings’ or ‘environments.’ To meet or parry these 
challenges, new responses are formulated because normal responses are habituated 
derivatives of normalized surroundings (the challenges of everyday life) and are therefore 
presumed to fail in extraordinary situations. Even standard adversarial practice, which 
aims to insure an ‘equality of arms’ in legal contests (such as in criminal cases) is 
problematized as insufficient relative to what is at stake in terms of the threat. As one 
respondent noted, we are “in a political environment where providing fairness to terrorists 
does not have a lot of public sympathy” (Interview with Lawyer (a), Toronto, October 
2014). Fairness is an affect deeply rooted in the Canadian law and multiculturalism and is 
embodied in numerous practices of inclusion, but also problematized.103 Post-9/11 
                                                
102 One respondent noted that it is between 2001 and 2004 that “all of [Canada’s] worst excesses happened” 
with regards to rights violations as a part of a “crack-down on Islamic extremists” (Interview with Journalist, 
Ottawa, January 2015). 
103  See Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2008); Day (2002); Mackey (1999); Thobani (2007). 
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responses that are directed at Muslims (Buck-Morss, 2003; Razack, 2008) are but one 
aspect of rights-denying practices directed at non-citizens.104  
In terms of temporalization/spatialization of this security project, two key points 
are identified, the threat and its placement under the jurisdiction of the SCI, and the 
ultimate reaction resulting in the deportation/banishment of the terror suspect. However, 
between suspicion and banishment a world is created where the response to the threat (the 
endgame of deportation and banishment) is ‘held-up’ or suspended (even indefinitely). 
This milieu occupies the interval between one state of affairs and another (Deleuze, 1986), 
but also serves as the medium needed to account for the action of one body on another at a 
distance (Foucault, 2007b). The interval is where qualities (the mood of the milieu) are 
actualised as forces in determinate, geographical, historical and social spacetimes 
(Deleuze, 1986: 141-143) and it is within and through the medium that a series of 
encounters take place between the forces of law and national security. Rather than a 
simple and single encounter of forces, force-relations are played out over time, through a 
series of minor contests and challenges between the independent forces of law and 
national security, each reacting to the actual and potential actions of the other and 
situation within an affect of unease. 
In the suspense of the SCI proceeding, the independent forces of law and security 
are compelled to interact with, respond to, or resolve the state of unease. While the 
government is concerned with challenging the state of unease as a national security 
problem by deporting/banning terrorist threats, named persons and their advocates are 
concerned with moderating the state of unease, to prevent deportation as well as other 
                                                
104 See Anderson (2013);  Bell (2011a); Benhabib (2004); Mountz (2010); Pratt (2005); Rygiel (2010); 
Stasiulis and Bakan (2005). 
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indirect outcomes. Authorized to defend Canada’s security challenge, government 
proponents (Ministers’ counsel) characterize the threat as one posed by hardened 
characters who need only the opportunity to unleash mayhem on Canadian soil.105 As 
counterpoint, friends, families, and legal advocates who rally around named persons, 
register distress about the ambiguous state and status of named persons, and their 
detention conditions and deportation outcomes (Interview with Community Organizer, 
Ontario, April 2015; Interview with Activist, May 2015; Interview with Activist, July 
2015; Interview with Supporter, Toronto, July 2015; See also Wala, 2014). For 
deportation opponents, the state of unease goes beyond the direct effects to concerns over 
the normalization of unjust practices targeting vulnerable groups such as Muslim non-
citizens.  
 The unease owed to the current state of affairs is significant and few are optimistic 
about the possibility of a single blow capable of bringing about its transformation with 
regards to rights honouring. While some activists are hopeful for change, there is a general 
sense that each separate SCI case will have to be fought independently and on its own 
merits within an environment that is perceived to be one-sided:  
The fact that a case worked or that the special advocate has success shouldn’t tell 
you about whether it is a good system or not...It doesn’t mean that the process is 
fair, it just means that they got this one right…You can’t judge a system by 
whether it worked in any particular case. (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 
2015) 
                                                




Noting recent Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) rulings that deem the SCI legislation 
constitutional, there is a feeling of resignation that the system is as fair as it can be: “once 
you’ve decided that the government can rely upon national security privileged [secret] 
information, then you have to have this kind of regime” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, 
April 2015). With regards to the government side of the courtroom, Justice Hugessen 
(2002: 385) notes: 
I have every confidence that the Department of Justice is doing the best it can. I 
am just not always satisfied that the best it can is always going to be the best. I do 
not know if there is any solution to this.  
There is ongoing concern that the process is not rigorous enough to assuage the state of 
unease and support trustworthy relations with foreign intelligence agencies.  
Though open counsel act as important supports for named persons, their power is 
restricted by limited access to the secret information and such monological encounters 
leave them unable to fully engage in their adversarial powers in the face of court 
challenges. When they were able to cross-examine the information, they were “met by 
comments by the judge, ‘I hear you. If that was all there was, I’d be with you’” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Ottawa, May 2015). In such situations, the judges have an authorial role and 
know more than the other characters. In these cases, open counsel play instrumental roles 
but are inadequately armed vis-à-vis their ministerial counterparts who possess surplus 
knowledge. Consequently, open counsels rely on the forces of special advocates as a third 
party to diffuse the dyadic relation and push information into the ‘public’ (non-secreted) 
domain, thus rectifying the dissymmetry of information (O’Connor, 2002: 164). Many of 
the court challenges centre around the forces of special advocates and their ability to see 
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or know fully the state of affairs that has implicated the suspects as national security 
threats. It is within the space of ‘bunkers’ that special advocates and judges wield their 
(sometimes limited) tools in an attempt to ameliorate unease. Within these spaces, 
procedural parameters drive the temporality of the work of special advocates and judges. 
The Bunkers: Authorial power and its limitations 
 
Spaces where classified information is reviewed by both judges and special 
advocates working within the SCI are referred to as ‘Bunkers,’ as is the secure courtroom 
space. The bunkers are characterized by an affect of discomfort and disorientation as a 
result of being atypical workspaces and contribute to the protracted temporality of the 
cases. In past iterations of the SCI, judges and Ministers’ counsel were the only actors 
authorized to view secret information; a ruling from Canada’s highest court led to the 
introduction of a new actor to support the named person. The Special Advocate Program 
(SAP) was established by the Department of Justice in 2008 following a 2007 ruling 
(Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC9). 
The SAP overcame the constitutionality challenge brought to and upheld by the SCC by 
introducing a new role under the SCI. Prior to the creation of the SAP, judges held ex 
parte hearings (with one of the parties in the dispute absent).106 Justice Hugessen (2002: 
384) notes that the security designated judges “hate” being in such a position where the 
“security blanket, which is the adversary system,” is absent. Here, judges are constrained 
by the SCI legislation, reflecting separation of government and earlier wariness of judicial 
involvement in security. While the judges have the jurisdiction and authority to admit 
                                                
106 Section 86 IRPA proceedings take place in a similar fashion to those of the SCI having the same 
consequences, but the appointment of a special advocate is discretionary rather than a right. An increasing or 
ongoing use of these proceedings is noted by advocates (Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March, 2015; 
Interview with Craig Forcese, Ottawa, October 2014; Interview with Yavar Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015). 
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‘evidence,’ they struggled to make such decisions owing to monological encounters and 
the limited ability to openly challenge that which is allowed to pass as evidence. In the 
face of such challenges, judges are divided, acting both privately (secretly) and publicly, 
resulting in disorganized or fractured judgements where the ‘public side’ is redacted or 
decisions are written in two separate iterations107: “It’s enormously time-consuming and 
requires attention to detail. We spend long hours in what we call the ‘bunker’…” 
(Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). Under SCI jurisdiction, security 
designated judges are constrained by legislation and relegated to arduous duties in 
inhospitable spaces of security. Review of sensitive information takes place in the bunker, 
that is, “in a sealed windowless courtroom deep in the bowels of a building in Ottawa 
where the air is terrible, [and] the only thing that is good is the coffee” (Hugessen, 2002: 
384).108 The mood within the bunkers is one of discontent.  
Prior to the SAP, only the judges and Ministers’ counsel had surplus knowledge 
via access to secret information. The introduction of special advocates added a semblance 
of the equality of arms to the SCI process. As one respondent noted, the “return to [the 
adversarial] system gave [judges] a great deal more comfort and confidence” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). The Special Advocate roster is a modified 
redeployment of the mechanisms used for closed hearings in criminal cases and by CSIS’s 
oversight body. One respondent found the creation of a roster of ‘security-cleared’ 
lawyers for other types of cases to be a convenient, though inadvertent, outcome of the 
SAP (Interview with Lawyer (a), Toronto, October 2014). Others saw the introduction of 
                                                
107 Vismann (2008) provides an insightful discussion on the history of files and the significance of their 
erasure and revision. 
108 The registry where court documents are filed and records of the courts are held has a separate section for 
designated proceedings (Interview with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014).  
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the amicus curiae (lit. friends of the court) as an important innovation for security 
intelligence cases in criminal courts (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). 
Conversely, the ready availability of such security-cleared lawyers can result in a ‘net-
widening’ of security processes enabling the government to over-claim security privilege 
rather than publically disclosing information to the accused and their (open) counsel; here, 
secrecy reinforces the state of unease. Expanding the use of secret courts runs counter to 
the fairness concerns of named persons and their ability to see, know, and meet the forces 
and charges against them. It is evident that the introduction of the SAP not only influences 
governing under the SCI, but has wider ramifications for the use of intelligence in 
courtrooms in general.  
The working conditions of the bunkers also add challenges for special advocates 
who are taken out of their usual working environment. As one respondent noted, their 
usual support team is absent; in addition to a lack of clerical assistance for typing, 
photocopying, and binding, “you’re learning how to use [computer software] without the 
assistance of people who could show you how to use the software because anything that 
comes up on the screen is going to be classified information” (Interview with Lawyer, 
Ottawa, February 2015; supported by Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). 
Working in the bunker also challenges the normal ambit of legal routines and practices: 
You’re in a secure space, which is difficult to work in because you don’t have your 
telephone, you don’t have email…you can leave the room, obviously. You are 
working with secure information. You can’t take it home. So, each day you have to 
close up all of your files and have them put away in a safe and each morning 
everything is brought out again to you and you set up your desk again, open all of 
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your binders again, start your computer up. So, each day you have to sort of get 
back up to speed in terms of organizing your materials so that you can work with 
them. (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015) 
Spatial constraints influence the temporality of the special advocates’ work: “It’s a 
laborious, time-consuming process, and the risk of that is that the special advocate will 
take short cuts to deal with the fact that there isn’t the ability to process all of the detailed 
information” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). Another special advocate 
commented on the “tons and tons and tons” of information that they have to go through in 
the solitude of the bunker (Interview with Lawyer (b), Toronto, October 2014) and that it 
takes an extensive amount of time to respond to the challenges of the Ministers’ case. One 
respondent noted that: “Because the issues were so complex…to have one lawyer 
operating solo and dealing with the evidence, and not even able to talk to anybody about 
it, was seen as unreasonable” (Interview with Lawyer (a), Toronto, October 2014; 
Supported by Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). As a result, two special 
advocates were assigned to each case. They would “try a little bit to divide up the work, 
although we really both had to go through all of the material so we were familiar with it” 
(Interview with Lawyer (b), Toronto, October 2014). Introducing this new role marginally 
alleviated the issue of surplus knowledge, but did not rectify the equality of arms concerns 
as advocates remained heavily outnumbered both during preparation and in the courtroom. 
One respondent described the lack of parity in the open courtroom, suggesting that 
it is similar to what takes place in the closed courtroom: “this whole team, every morning, 
six, eight lawyers, people carrying briefcases, junior lawyers, senior lawyers, employees 
of the Ministries come in, and you’ve got the lone special advocate just sitting there with 
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his or her computer, monitoring the proceedings” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, 
February, 2015). The SAP provided special advocates with surplus knowledge over open 
counsel, but they had less capacity to act on it—including open communication with the 
named person. One respondent noted, “one of the limitations of the special advocate’s role 
is there’s no express acknowledgement in the Act of an ability to call evidence” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). While special advocates do a “very detail-oriented 
examination of thousands and thousands of documents,” they do not have the power to 
present their own evidence (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). They can 
only attempt to parry the actions and ‘evidence’ brought by the Ministers’ counsel. The 
space of the closed courtroom was meant to expand the capabilities of lawyers to act on 
behalf of named persons; however, it is apparent that those in the role of special advocate 
are constrained in their tools and abilities to ‘lawyer.’ Both spatial and temporal 
configurations under the SCI reinforce limits rather than expanding the authorial power of 
the special advocates. 
SCI cases were also challenging for Ministers’ counsel:  
They have very busy workloads and limited ability to devote time and resources to 
these files… They resented having to do overtime… They resented having to work 
weekends when other colleagues of theirs in the Department of Justice had easy 
nine-to-five jobs. The role of being government counsel on these security 
certificate cases was much harder work than many other Department of Justice 
roles and I don’t think they got any more money for it. So, you could sense the 
resentment … (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015) 
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The time it takes for the SCI cases to make their way through the courts is widely held as 
an inefficient process that affects all counsel in addition to the prolonged precarity of 
named persons and their families. For example, in the Mahjoub case:  
The certificate was issued in February 2008, disclosure occurred throughout 2008 
and yet it is just now headed to the Federal Court of Appeal109 and we are what? 
Seven years later. And the man—from the Government’s point of view, a person 
who shouldn’t be in Canada—is still here. From his point of view, he has had 
seven years of hell and you might say seven years of additional hell because he 
went through the initial process of the certificate issued in around ’99-2000, and 
then had it restarted in 2008. (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015) 
The temporal extension of SCI cases has been criticized openly by judges in their Reasons 
for Decision. One respondent noted having to deal with information from multiple 
government departments leading to much repetition: “It’s not unusual to see the same 
information repeated over, and over, and over again in multiple documents” (Interview 
with Judge, Ottawa, December 2014). The judge is, nevertheless, expected to be well-
versed on the case making it necessary for them to go through all information presented. 
One judge explicitly acknowledged the extent of the process in their decision: “It was 
impossible for the Court to proceed more expeditiously… These have been lengthy 
proceedings” (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 (CanLII), para. 38). In the same case, another 
was critical of the confidential submissions: “…it is my view that it was unnecessary to 
conduct a portion of the appeal hearing behind closed doors” (Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII), para. 23). The spatial 
                                                
109 The Federal Court of Appeal rejected the challenges on July 19, 2017 (Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157 (CanLII)). 
 
 112 
considerations that result from managing surplus knowledge impact the temporal aspect of 
the process, sometimes needlessly. Frustratingly, what was initially devised as an 
‘expedited’ deportation order has transformed into a lengthy process that benefits none of 
the actors involved. 
As one respondent noted, open counsel struggled with time despite having no role 
managing surplus knowledge; making living conditions tolerable for named persons made 
it “challenging at times to feel sort of divided between what were, really, bail review writ 
very, very large and the trial itself” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). One 
respondent noted that the cases being publicly aided has impacted the lengthiness of these 
cases with some public counsel taking the approach of “spot the issue, argue the issue, 
regardless of its merit, regardless of whether or not the cost in terms of time and effort is 
worth the ultimate benefit” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 2015). However, the 
lawyers arguing points are savvy to the transformative nature of the SCI and realize that 
they have a pivotal role to play in ensuring the best possible precedent for persons  named 
in any future certificates; though perhaps not operating in ‘real time,’ the importance and 
ramification of these seemingly minor battles are not self-evident to all actors (Walters, 
2017). Though open counsel are unable to aid robustly in the reasonability determinations 
when limited information is made public, they have an important role in protecting the 
rights of named persons. There are many factors contributing to the protraction of these 
cases, but the management of surplus knowledge is pivotal; regardless of the reasons, the 




Motions to improve the living conditions were left to open counsel, while special 
advocates focused on the ultimate reasonability determinations by working to push 
information out to open counsel. As noted above, open counsel are constrained by 
dissymmetry of information, rather than the physical space they are working in. They 
spend a great deal of time on moot challenges that resulted from limited knowledge of the 
full case against their client(s): “As public counsel, it’s extremely frustrating…that would 
be a polite way to describe it” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, April 2015). Without the 
support of special advocates and surplus knowledge, public counsel was nearly powerless 
to successfully challenge certificates. They were, however, active and overall effective in 
challenging detainment, conditions of detention, and conditions of release. Though this 
took time away from preparations for the reasonableness hearings, it was “necessary to 
focus on the day-to-day stuff …[and we]… spent days and days and days in court dealing 
with [it]” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015). These small, lower court, 
challenges tested the government’s level-of-threat arguments and culminated in precedent 
for reasonableness challenges before the SCC. Though limited in what could be included, 
crucial information and decisions were dealt with in public courtroom spaces. 
The lengthy cobbling together of forces is done at the expense of named persons’ 
liberties, especially with the second iteration of certificates after the introduction of 
special advocates. A new system cost these individuals significant time with regards to 
how long court cases “should” take and significantly impacted the course of their lives; 
named persons are at different stages with regards to marriage and children and some have 
missed out on opportunities as a result of their detention and precarious situation 
(Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015; Interview with Activist, Ottawa, May 
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2015; See also Wala, 2014). Noting that the process will never again take this long, 
respondents had varying perspectives on whether another certificate would ever be issued. 
One held that because changes to disclosure procedures were being proposed to the SCI 
under Bill C-51 (assented June 18, 2015) (Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015), the government 
must see the SCI as a viable option (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, February 2015). 
Another respondent noted that if managed properly SCI proceedings could run smoothly: 
“I don’t imagine, if properly organized, that these cases should take more than, at the trial 
level, start to finish a year to eighteen months” (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, April 
2015). While another stated: “I don’t think security certificates are going to be used that 
much more” (Interview with Lawyer (a), Toronto, October 2014). But as another noted 
“everyone has more clarity about how these things are meant to unfold now” as opposed 
to the ad hoc-ness of the initial procedures (Interview with Lawyer, Toronto, January 
2015). The many small challenges have made the process more efficient for the future, but 
have resulted in significant and crucial portions of lives being lost to detention and 
surveillance. 
The bunker is a spacetime for the ongoing management of secret information that 
avoids public accessibility; here, information is kept from open counsel who act as a 
proxy for the conventions of law. When working in the bunker, where there is access to 
surplus knowledge, special advocates act as a mediator between the transparency of law 
and the secrecy of security, but their normal powers of cross-examination are severely 
limited. As a reaction to minor contestations over the equality of arms, the SAP extends 
the gap between the norm and exception by addressing the equality of arms, but limiting 
authorial powers. The extraordinary work and extra time required to manage surplus 
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knowledge also hinders the right to a fair and speedy trial. It is clear that the bunkers and 
public courtroom are spaces in which a governing process is at work, but must note that 
the challenge of ameliorating insecurity is made more difficult by spatial, temporal, and 
jurisdictional constraints placed on actors who are limited in their powers and authority 
while working in a state of unease. 
The Diminishing Threat 
 
Deportation and banishment are the ultimate endgame of the SCI as a security 
project whereas the goal of the legal challenge is to represent an equality of arms contest 
in a public space. The security strategy is a problem of spacetimes given that the banned 
named person would, ideally, fall expediently under the jurisdiction of another state.110 
The intention of banning individuals from Canadian soil as a measure of security was 
questioned by one respondent as a strategy of merely “exporting the problem” (Interview 
with Lawyer, Toronto, January 2015).111 Banishment also encompasses a risk that 
suspects are “irretrievably lost from surveillance, and might be a greater threat than they 
would be living in Brampton [and] raising a family” (Interview with Lawyer, Ottawa, 
February 2015). The benefits of pre-deportation detention as an intelligence-gathering 
instrument were also noted (Interview with Lawyer (a), Ottawa, October 2014; See also 
De Genova, 2007). However, because the threat is perceived to decrease over time, as one 
respondent noted, “how do you deport someone that’s no longer a risk?” (Interview with 
Activist, Ottawa, May 2015). 
                                                
110 For a discussion of the ban-opticon see (Bigo, 2006). 
111 The power of the SCI as a legislative mandate from Parliament is evident in the end goal of deportation 
being a question of government policy that obliges the CBSA to carry out their mandate. One respondent 
noted that CBSA officers view themselves as merely following orders regardless of their own personal 
views on the SCI (Interview with Activist, Ottawa, May 2015). 
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While deportation fails as a mechanism for security, extending the spacetime of 
the legal-security contest through SCI proceedings may serve as a functional equivalent of 
securitization by diminishing the threat. It is evident from judicial decisions that judges 
saw time as mitigating the threat posed by named persons. For most, the passage of time 
decreased the terrorist threat: “It is unlikely that after such a prolonged period of detention 
that he could re-enter the life that he had and reactivate his contacts…” (Almrei (Re), 2009 
FC 1263 (CanLII), para. 507). Importantly, Justice Mosley acknowledges that his 2009 
decision to quash the certificate against Mr. Almrei was not a criticism of the 2001 
decision to uphold the certificate, which he reasons was appropriate at the time (Almrei 
(Re), 2009 FC 1263 (CanLII)). A similar statement is made about Mr. Harkat without the 
outcome of a quashed certificate: “I find that although the danger associated to Mr. Harkat 
has diminished over time, he still poses a danger to Canada, but at a lesser level” (Harkat 
(Re), 2010 FC 1241 (CanLII), para. 13). Two respondents made similar observations with 
regards to the publicity of the cases (wrought through the forces of legality) that highlight 
the jurisdiction each judge has over the case before them. One respondent stated that 
according to a judge, Mr. Harkat’s high profile made him less of a threat; however, they 
were concerned that he was being made an example of because his case was so public as a 
result of the powerful political campaigning on his behalf (Interview with Activist, 
Ottawa, May 2015). Time and notoriety being held against named persons was also 
evident in Mr. Mahjoub’s case: according to one respondent, CSIS’s “weird” theory is that 
named persons are  
still seen to be threats to security, not because they’re dangerous, but [because] 
other people will get inspired if they become free. So, it’s a really perverse kind 
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of argument. Like some of the most scrutinized individuals in…Canadian 
national security history… are going to inspire a lot of extremist activity. 
(Interview with Yavar Hameed, Ottawa, June 2015) 
The notoriety gained over the course of fifteen years is highlighted as a concern by CSIS 
within their submissions to the court. Significantly, Mr. Charkaoui was scrutinized years 
after his certificate had been quashed when students from an institution he instructs at 
were connected with extremist activity (Interview with Activist, Ottawa, May 2015; See 
also Perreaux and LeBlanc, 2015). It seems that even when cleared, the SCI remains a 
dark cloud over named persons. The extent to which elements of cases moved into public 
space is seen to offer both advantage and disadvantage, as did the course of time during 
which their ordeals occur(red). 
Mr. Harkat’s SCI case reached culmination in a SCC ruling with the relation of 
legal and national security forces reaching a stalemate. The SCC ruled the certificate 
reasonable and sanctioned Mr. Harkat’s removal to Algeria (or another country that will 
accept him), however the government has yet to assert its final move of deporting against 
a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA).112 113 With the secret evidence set aside, Mr. 
Harkat’s immigration counsel now fights his removal, while Mr. Mahjoub has recently 
(July 2017) had his challenges rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal (Mahjoub v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157 (CanLII); Perkel, 2017) and 
continues to live in limbo under release conditions with the possibility of the SCC hearing 
                                                
112 The PRRA provides an overview of any safety concerns associated with deporting an individual, though 
there is no absolute legal ruling preventing Canada from deporting to torture. 
113 A country may provide a ‘reasonable assurance’ they will not torture or act unreasonably towards a 
returned individual, however one respondent noted that those “reasonable assurances are probably not worth 
the paper they’re printed on” (Interview with Lawyer (a), Ottawa, October 2014). 
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his case or of deportation. Messrs. Charkaoui, Almrei,114 and Jaballah, however, have 
successfully challenged their certificates and the national security threats they pose have 
been neutralized according to the courts. For these cases the correct mix of forces have 
resulted in a transformation of the threat situation. The SCI as a legal chronotope has had 
diverse outcomes for each case as they have developed under varying actors working 
under fluctuating governing mechanisms and spacetime formations. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows how the SCI enacted a milieu in which a fluid and uncertain 
assemblage of legal and national security forces engaged in a series of challenges aimed 
ultimately at neutralizing threats. Interviews and court documents reveal that the 
assembled SCI characters lack sufficient or effective force to ‘win’ the confrontation—
even if in possession of surplus knowledge—and end up simply trying ‘make do’ and 
‘make the best of it’ in a protracted struggle of legal and security strategies. It still is 
unclear whether Messrs. Harkat, Suresh, and Al Yamani will face deportation to potential 
ill-treatment.115 Additionally, Mr. Mahjoub has still not had a reasonableness 
determination from the highest court and may have his certificate dropped or may face 
deportation. The chronotope aids in an understanding of how, when, and by whom 
national security threats are managed. A consideration of spacetimes exposes nuances that 
prompt that larger and less obscured practices of national security; a lack of clerical 
assistance contributes to prolonged liminality under the guise of insecurity. The above 
discussion provides just one approach to looking at the SCI; adjustment of the chronotopic 
                                                
114 Mr. Almrei is facing criminal allegations with regards to providing false documents—an allegation in his 
Certificate—following his SCI ordeal (Freeze, 2014). 
115 Though “Canadian law and international norms reject deportation to torture,” the SCC has not ruled 
absolutely against it (Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 3, 2002 
SCC 1 (CanLII)). 
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lens may render insight into various other pieces such as the racialized components of 
national security management, or further perspective on the moments of resistance within 
national security governance.  
The failure of the securitization to resolve in normal fashion (per the SCI 
initiative), the difference between suspicion (based on security intelligence), and 
deportation and banishment opens a spacetime of contestation. Rather than a full-on 
confrontation, the contest is differentiated in a series of minor challenges involving 
differences between disclosure and secrecy, evidence and intelligence, and detention and 
punishment, that is, between the forces of law and the forces of security. This relation of 
independent forces results in the formation of new security-legality assemblages that 
emerge from the legalization of security and the securitization of law. The failure of law to 
resolve in normal fashion (through disclosure, cross examination, equality of arms, habeas 
corpus) results in bunkers, secret courts, and nested detention facilities, combined with 
securitized agents of legality (special advocates and securitized judges) to form this 
assemblage. 
Ultimately, the transformation from insecurity to security has been achieved 
through the multiple small challenges and changes to the SCI. Use of the chronotope, as 
the appearance of spatial-temporal formations, shows the threat situation as gradually 
altered through use of an assemblage of criminal, civil, and immigration law with a novel 
cast of characters working under innovative spacetimes. Special judges and various 
counsellors continue to struggle with a situation that oscillates between the (legal) norm 
and the (national security) exception. The centre of gravity around which the conflict turns 
is the complicated presence/absence of secret intelligence information, and the aim, on 
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one hand, to protect the secret and its sources, and, on the other, make the secret known by 
pushing it into the public domain where it can be challenged (through the legal 
conventions of disclosure and cross-examination). While the future of the SCI as a way to 
govern problems is uncertain, the merging of secret (security) information and special 
procedures and agents within legal proceedings has allowed us to illustrate how the 





The dimensions of detention, legal wrangling, and spacetimes operationalized 
under the Security Certificate Initiative (SCI) illustrate the SCI as a failing operation 
(Higgins, 2004). Though successful in espionage cases, the deployment of the SCI for 
managing terror threats reveals the extensive revisions (Walters, 2017) necessary to 
operationalize governmental threat management objectives, namely, the expedient 
deportation of named persons. Ultimately, the SCI achieves some level of threat 
mitigation through a complex assemblage of agents and technologies borrowed from other 
registers; however, the objective of the ban is thwarted by recently introduced elements. 
Indeterminate detention in institutions followed by (equally indeterminate) conditional 
release via community surveillance and sureties in the context of extensive legal-security 
proceedings establishes a temporal framework for threat mitigation, rather than immediate 
deportation. The use of unconventional technologies, such as familial sureties and 
community release and the use of intelligence in the courts prove problematic as ways to 
defuse threats to national security. Using intelligence as evidence and proof of these 
threats complicates the actions and capacities of characters involved in the SCI 
proceedings. Further, consideration of the SCI as a chronotope helps to bring to the fore 
the cobbling together of forces under SCI in an effort to achieve the desired state of 
security. 
The main concern with the SCI as a governing mechanism is the use of 
intelligence to pursue national security threats. Intelligence in release decisions results in 
problematic notions of risk that proliferate the unchecked power of petty sovereigns  
couching ad hoc decision-making within actuarial notions of courtroom justice. The 
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breakdown of rule of law is reflected in the amalgamation of select criminal, 
administrative, and civil processes. Though simulation problematizes the idea of justice as 
‘really real’ or ‘genuine’ even within the criminal justice system, the added referents 
involved in substituting intelligence for evidence reflects a process that is nearly 
unrecognizable from its (albeit copied) original. Such practices bolster the potential for 
homo sacer existence among all (non-) political subjects as citizens and non-citizens alike 
are governed in an environment of heighted fear, and (especially racialized) othering. 
Further, the normalization of specialized workspaces and extended timelines for managing 
secret information drives the legitimacy of using (otherwise non-vetted) intelligence to 
pursue national security threats. Comparisons to the criminal justice system are useful for 
reflecting upon what is becoming customary as a form of ‘national security justice,’ 
however, deprecation of rights generates a longing for the protections of the criminal 
justice system while overlooking the unjust practices contained therein. The scrutiny and 
consequent transformation of the SCI has resulted in its apparent abandonment as a viable 
assemblage for governing national security concerns. 
The Bigger Picture 
 
The in-depth consideration of certificates provided by this dissertation is valuable 
because it reflects practices that are becoming regularized within citizenship governance 
in Canada under the guise of ‘regular’ (or ‘normal’) immigration proceedings. Since the 
development of the full “Initiative” under the Department of Justice, a new certificate has 
not been issued. However, ‘normal’ rather than ‘exceptional’ channels are increasingly 
being used for national security inadmissibility based deportations. While careful 
consideration of the five cases highlighted within this dissertation exposed significant 
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limitations with the SCI, many court challenges have rectified some of the transparency 
issues and transformed the SCI into a more robust system with some checks and balances. 
Importantly, the earlier limitations of the SCI suggest that a system without an advocate 
privy to all information against an individual is not suitable when the outcome is 
deportation—and especially when the deportation may be to maltreatment. Under the SCI, 
a small number of individuals now have (limited) lines of defense against secret 
information through the Special Advocate Program while many more individuals are 
facing the same knowledge deficit and outcome without any protections. 
Removals without adequate legal counsel occur daily amounting to hundreds of 
individuals being deported on information not disclosed to them or scrutinized at a 
meaningful level. Essentially, the same process as the SCI is taking place under Section 86 
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act without the (imperfect) scrupulousness 
offered by the SCI, creating a multi-tiered system (Rygiel, 2012) that does not treat all 
cases equally. As noted, the function of special advocates has expanded into criminal 
cases for which it was not developed, however their use in normal immigration cases are 
discretionary rather than obligatory. While the SCI has spurred a popular movement in 
opposition to ‘secret trials’ and indeterminate detention, Section 86 proceedings are taking 
place expeditiously, in a greater number, and are largely unnoticed by the general 
population. Just as little was known about the SCI in public space pre-9/11, Section 86 
proceedings are ongoing with little scrutiny and no transparent court proceedings, 
indicating that “Critique is without end” (Pavlich, 2001a: 153).116 In effect, the Canadian 
                                                
116 My assumption is that those being affected by Section 86 proceedings have not been in Canada long 
enough to garner connections and support for their deportation to be challenged in the political realm and are 
at the whim of government decisions even when represented by skilled immigration counsel. 
 
 124 
Government is complicit in carrying out a process that has otherwise been determined 
unconstitutional by the Courts through the Charkaoui II ruling. 
One respondent noted that the robust communication between the special advocate 
and named person that was established in the Harkat decision (Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 2 SCR 33, 2014 SCC 37 (CanLII)), despite coming about 
late in the day, has made the Special Advocate Program and the SCI quite good:  
I think what you’re seeing is a diversion of cases away from the security certificate 
context and…into the regular immigration proceedings, which are before an 
immigration adjudicator and where they can use more short-hand tactics to remove 
persons without triggering this whole complicated special advocate apparatus… 
And so I’m really not comfortable with the idea that they’re using these regular 
immigration proceedings to have their way with an immigration adjudicator. It’s 
not a transparent, robust system. (Interview with Craig Forcese, Ottawa, October 
2014).  
With the diversion of cases there is a loss of the special advocate as an actor. However ill-
equipped, special advocates have had successes and provide a layer of protection. Their 
absence opens up a space for abuse of process and grave rights violations. The Section 86 
cases are not automatically put in front of a judge, but are often decided by adjudicators 
who are appointed senior immigration officials. Limited publicity and transparency 
precludes Section 86 proceedings from being ‘taken up’ as a public concern. 
Significantly, the SCI gained momentum as a popular issue and two additional concerned 
respondents noted that similar cases are being carried out under Section 86 with much less 
fanfare. Open counsel Yavar Hameed stated: 
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I think it’s really unfortunate that we have security certificates and I think that it’s 
fascinating the way that the law works, but it’s weird that there is so much 
attention…politically and academically and socially on the certificate when it 
makes up such a small proportion of the way that danger and threat are dealt with 
on a daily basis within our immigration system. (Ottawa, June 2015)  
Moving security deportation measures to the peripheries is the most efficient and 
convenient way for the government to deport on grounds of security inadmissibility. Pre-
9/11, the certificates were obscure and relatively unknown to the general public (perhaps 
they still are) but as the more recent five named persons and their cases gained support 
and publicity, methods have moved away from certificates towards more ‘fringe’ 
proceedings that lack even the reduced protections of the SCI. This makes deportation on 
the grounds of security more expedient in terms of time while isolating the process in a 
space that avoids public scrutiny. Another respondent stated that:  
All of the concerns that we have about the security certificate procedure are 
exactly the same for the Section 86 cases. And the one concern I have about the 
security certificate advocacy at the grassroots level is that there hasn’t been enough 
attention to the link between these two things…. Because even if the government 
never introduces another security certificate, it’s doing all of this same stuff 
through Section 86. (Interview with Lawyer, Ontario, March 2015)  
By investigating the SCI, around which there is now rich involvement and knowledge, this 
dissertation offers insight into governing through secrecy more generally and thus 
provides a solid framework for the examination of the more widely used Section 86 
procedures. Governing through secrecy is concerning as it prevents individuals from 
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speaking to their own ‘case’ in an informed manner. The potential for individuals to be 
deported to maltreatment is a contravention of their rights; if such a decision is made, it 
should be done with full transparency for concerned parties and their legal counsel. It 
seems that inadmissibility technologies have come full circle from attempts to keep 
security and intelligence out of the courts, to the SCI having a full panoply of security 
issues before Federal Court judges, and back to Section 86 cases occurring before an 
adjudicator (as the SCI was initially devised). 
Keeping in mind that “genealogy is always partial”, this dissertation denaturalizes 
practices of governance (Walters, 2017: 798) that use secrecy to violate rights and allows 
us to rethink any governing assemblage that makes use of such mechanisms with mixed 
outcomes. In doing so, shifts in ways of thinking about and acting on non-citizen threats 
and how the ban is carried out become unmistakable. Arguably, SCI proceedings have 
become too arduous, or perhaps too rigorous, for the government to continue using them. 
However, this dissertation analyzes and illuminates the issues and concerns supporting 
this particular governing assemblage, how and what technologies have been 
operationalized, and the iteration and reiteration of the national security/legality 
problematic; moves to exceptionalize security measures are not new, and the (il)legality 
has not been resolved by the creation of tools such as special advocates and bunkers. The 
publicity of the SCI and its rendition in public and closed courtrooms provides insight into 
the innuendo of cases that are not normal immigration decisions but establish immigration 
and security inadmissibility precedents. It is arguable that there is a long way to go to 
protect the rights of named persons under the SCI, but even more concerning are the 
proceedings that neglect even those limited protections. However, the extent to which the 
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SCI and Section 86 proceedings contribute to the non-event is unknown (Massumi, 2009), 
that is, the lack of a coordinated mass-casualty terrorist attack on Canadian soil.117 The 
balance of security and rights protections is not easily determinable. 
With the understanding that the use of intelligence in national security cases is 
what spurs the negation of any sense of justice under the SCI and Section 86 proceedings, 
the creation of an international body for managing both intelligence and national security 
concerns/cases could be remedial. As noted, intelligence is problematic because of its 
unknown provenance and the need to protect sources, both individual CIs and states. By 
globally centralizing and standardizing practices of gathering, vetting, retaining, and 
sharing, intelligence could achieve a level of legitimacy currently attributed to evidence. 
This is not to suggest that criminal standards of evidence are beyond criticism, however, 
they operate at a higher level of scrutiny and acceptability among citizenry. A single 
organization, rather than agreements or pacts among already agencies,118 could undermine 
current problematic practices and offer greater transparency to information available. In 
coordination with centralized intelligence handling, a judicial body that is independent 
from, but privy to the intelligence practices could offer a venue for processing cases 
dependent upon secret information. By separating (inter)national security concerns from 
domestic courtrooms, the already existent leaching of law into security and security into 
law could be discontinued.  
Securatized Legality and Legalized Security 
 
This dissertation provides an analysis of a double movement towards securitizing 
legality and legalizing security. There were early concerns with rights and justice during 
                                                
117 This is not to diminish occurrences such as the Quebec City mosque shooting of January 29, 2017 (see 
Belanger, 2017), or the shootings at École Polytechnique (in 1989) or Dawson College (in 2006).  
118 Such as the ‘Five Eyes.’ 
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its initial formulation (Senate of Canada, 1977), and continued attempts to keep the SCI 
out of the courts a decade later (House of Commons, 1987). The recent culmination of 
these cases saw the clear judicialization of intelligence as an issue for CSIS as judges 
weigh in on issues of security. The creep of security into the courts enables security 
measures to be legalized (once ruled unconstitutional (illegal), the SCI has been revised to 
fall within the parameters of legality, though some respondents are skeptical of the ruling). 
Separation of the three branches of government is a longstanding doctrine in Canadian 
law, but branches may enhance each other’s power in addition to checking it (Lagassé, 
2012). In effect, the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches have each 
legitimized varying components of the SCI allowing for the convergence of security and 
legality. The movements of security into law and law into security is facilitated by the 
assembling and reassembling of governing mechanisms that combine criminal and 
administrative elements and make use of legal hybridity (Trubek and Trubek, 2005). 
These movements reinforce the suspended state of banishment from political life (Bigo, 
2006). 
The hybridity of the SCI is evident in the legal maneuvering of judges and 
lawyers, as explained in the Reasons for Decisions, and written about elsewhere (Forcese, 
2008; Forcese and Waldman, 2008; Hudson, 2010; Roach, 2009). However, this 
dissertation offered an analysis outside of the “jurisprudential view” and “the box of legal 
logic” (Calavita, 2010: 4) by examining the ramifications of SCI for law and society. It 
provides important insight into the gap between “law-on-the-books” and “law-in-action” 
(Calavita, 2010) by elucidating the structural problems of the SCI in practice. The work 
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required to both challenge and uphold the SCI reflects the limits of the SCI and forms the 
basis of its reimagining. 
The SCI, as a legal assemblage, provides a compelling case for examining the 
interplay of forces governing the ever-transforming relation of immigration and security. 
Due to its changing nature, this analysis approached the SCI “as a dynamic and 
experimental assemblage of elements” (Walters, 2017: 794) and extended the analytic 
scope beyond space and time to also consider the jurisdictional elements of intelligence in 
the courts. The reassembling is viewed as adaptations to the multifaceted nature of 
national security governance as complexities arise, while the division of the SCI into 
carceral and judicial spaces reflects occurrences of nodal governance, which facilitates the 
concentration of power rather than its dispersion (Burris et al., 2005). Maintaining the 
administrative structure of the SCI ensures that discretion is not afforded to normal (non-
national security designated) judges, juries, meaningful defense counsel, or the accused, as 
expected in the criminal justice system; protecting intelligence ensures that there is a 
knowledge deficit. Rather than abolish the system, as advocates have called for, the SCI 
has undergone endless changes to maintain its existence. Its persistence is founded it its 
constant transformation (Walters, 2017) and resistance to normalized channels of justice. 
The management of national security suspects in Canada uncovers an active 
relationship between the norm and the exception and exposes state power with limited 
restrictions. Rather than describing and labelling the SCI as a state of exception, beyond 
the law, this examination of the struggle to normalize undefined detention and unchecked 
deportation exposes the inner workings and mechanisms of a normalized state of 
exception within the law. It also shows how exceptional governing structures form from a 
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patchwork of discrete decision-making authorities (petty sovereigns in Butler's (2004) 
articulation) and technologies borrowed from other governance registers, rather than from 
the prowess of systematic, effectual, and singular sovereign power. The SCI remains on 
the margins of what is otherwise accepted under Canadian law; this dissertation addressed 
the limits of detention, evidence, and spatial-temporal practices. The unending force to 
keep the SCI normalized pushes the limits of the state of exception as it maintains the 
potential for homo sacer existence (Agamben, 1998, 1999, 2005). There is a need to 
reconsider the implications for justice when people are deported and banned, or rather, 
maintained in a state of deportability from Canadian soil without being privy to the 
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